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Abstract 
 
The first chapter evaluates the zero-leverage effect on firms' financial constraints. 
Moreover, using investment- and cash-to-cash-flow sensitivities as financial constraint 
indicators, the results suggest that unleveraged firms are expected to face lower constraints 
relative to leveraged firms. Lastly, the results indicate that the zero-leverage effect on firms’ 
financial constraints is more likely stronger for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with 
lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms. The second chapter develops a new 
quantitative measure that reflects the extent to which a firm complies to Shariah relative to 
the other firms located in a certain region at a certain time. This measure can be customized 
to be consistent with each investor’s objectives, constraints, and beliefs. We argue that the 
use of this measure is preferable to the existing use of ratio thresholds for the following two 
reasons. First, it is more Shariah-appropriate because it provides the Shariah-compliant 
investor with a clear understanding of the relative compliance status of each firm he wishes 
to invest in. Second, it can be incorporated into any portfolio optimization model to create a 
balance between improving Shariah compliance and not compromising investment returns. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G31, G32, G33. 
  
Keywords: leverage, financial constraints, zero leverage, equity screens, compliance.
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CHAPTER 1 
The Zero Leverage Effect on Firms’ Financial Constraints 
 
1. Introduction: 
Agency problems and capital market imperfections (i.e., information asymmetries, 
transaction costs, taxes, etc.) make the costs of external capital greater than the 
opportunity cost of internal finances. As a result, firms will start financing their 
current and future investments using their internally generated funds. When 
internal finances are exhausted, the potential returns of the remaining investment 
opportunities are compared to the costs of external capital. If the potential returns 
are lower than the costs of external funds, firms will forgo some of their profitable 
investments. The above discussion explains why firms can be financially constrained 
and why firms’ investments may be sensitive to the extent of internal finances. 
  
Empirical studies show that certain firm characteristics could potentially mitigate 
the severity of a firm’s financial constraints. Examples of such characteristics include 
firms with concentrated ownership, firms with management ownership, firms with 
high credit rating, large mature firms, multidivisional firms, and bank-connected 
firms. Obviously, financial constraints of firms lacking the above characteristics are 
more likely to be higher. Connecting between the theoretical explanations and the 
empirical findings, it seems clear that the above-mentioned firm characteristics do 
mitigate financial constraints by loosening the effects of agency problems and/or 
capital market imperfections. For example, Brennan and Hughes (1991) imply that 
larger corporations have fewer information asymmetries than smaller companies, 
making them more financially flexible and reducing their external financing costs. 
Consistent with this view, Fazzari et al. (1988) hypothesize that investment-to-cash-
flow sensitivity increases as market financial frictions increase. 
 
To our knowledge, the previous literature did not explicitly examine the level of 
financial constraints in zero-leverage (hereafter, ZL) firms. This study contributes to 
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the corporate finance literature by evaluating firms’ financial constraint status across 
different sorts of zero- and low-leveraged firms. Over the previous few decades, 
researchers have proposed many financial constraint indicators. One commonly used 
constraint indicator is a firm’s leverage ratio. Due to bankruptcy costs, companies 
with higher leverage outstanding are likely to have limited access to external capital 
and thus greater levels of financial constraints. However, several researchers 
document that leverage's endogeneity feature can lead to a complex non-monotonic 
relationship between financial constraints and leverage (e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 
2007; Acharya et al., 2007). So, we argue that to understand how firms’ financial 
constraints are associated with leverage, one needs to investigate the level of 
constraints across different sorts of unlevered firms using several dimensions 
pertaining to research methodology. 
 
We argue that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is expected to vary 
depending on the firm lifecycle stage. For example, the ZL effect is expected to 
decrease as firms move towards their mature lifecycle stage. Firms in their startup 
or early growth stages are expected to have financial constraint levels that are 
extremely susceptible to leverage levels. As firms become more mature, their 
financial constraint levels become less affected by leverage levels.  Since gauging 
financial constraints is crucial in this paper, we use multiple approaches for gauging 
financial constraints. First, we measure the ZL effect on investment- and cash-to-
cash-flow sensitivities. Next, using a three-way interacted multivariate regression 
model, we test whether the ZL effect on investment- and cash-to-cash-flow 
sensitivities is different for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with lower 
proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms compared to larger firms, dividend-
paying firms, firms with higher proportions of tangible assets, and value firms, 
respectively. 
 
This paper is motivated by Strebulaev and Yang (2013), who suggest that family-
companies and companies with higher management ownership likely to have lower 
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levels of leverage. Managers with substantial ownership are expected to be under-
diversified, making their personal distress costs relatively-higher. Similarly, family 
members focus on maintaining the family legacy and hence try to avoid leverage due 
to their desire for long-term survival. Strebulaev and Yang argue that firms’ 
governance characteristics and ownership structure are important determinants of 
the ZL phenomena. But there are also other possible determinants. Investigating the 
level of constraints within different groups of unlevered firms may contribute to 
understanding the motives of following conservative debt policies.  
 
This paper hypothesizes that, on average, unlevered firms are expected to face 
lower financial constraints relative to leveraged firms. Moreover, the ZL effect on 
firms’ financial constraints is more likely to be weaker for smaller firms, zero-
dividend firms, firms with lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms. 
Using two alternative financial constraint measures, the results indicate that 
unleveraged firms have lower levels of financial constraints relative to leveraged 
firms. Furthermore, the negative ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker 
for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with higher proportions of tangible 
assets, and value firms. The results are consistent with the debt overhang theory that 
explains how the existence of leverage can reduce firms’ value by weakening their 
incentive for undertaking profitable future investments (Myers, 1977). Moreover, the 
results suggest that firms in their early lifecycles should avoid increasing their 
leverage levels. This will allow them to overcome the effects of financial constraints 
and to utilize their valuable future investment opportunities. Finally, the results 
have vital implications. For example, several studies hypothesize that firms’ financial 
constraints can have considerable effects on firms’ investments, capital structure, and 
stock returns (e.g., Lamont et al., 2001; Hennessy and Whited, 2007). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two highlights some of the capital 
market imperfection theories and discusses some of the empirical studies that relate 
to financial constraints. Section three develops our research hypothesis. Section four 
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presents the data sources and methodology. Section five analyzes and reports the 
results. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Aspects and Literature Overview: 
2.1. The theoretical explanation: 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) traditional neoclassical investment theory implies 
that, in a perfect capital market, companies undertake any profitable project and the 
choice of financing mix is irrelevant. According to this theory, internal funds’ 
availability does not affect investment decisions. Managers perceive the opportunity 
cost of internally generated funds to be the market interest rate, and they can lend 
and borrow at this rate. With capital market imperfections, however, prices and 
interest rates do not fully adjust to allow firms to undertake all desired investments. 
Under these circumstances, firms' investment and financing decisions are 
interdependent. If firm insiders have better information about the firm’s risk and 
return than do potential investors, then external financing costs will increase relative 
to internal financing. 
 
The primary insight on the effects of asymmetric information comes from Akerlof's 
(1970) analysis of the "lemons" problem, in which the vendors of a product have more 
information about its quality than do purchasers. Since outsiders cannot differentiate 
between good and bad investment projects, they will require higher returns from good 
projects to cover the losses incurred from inadvertently purchasing bad ones. Hence, 
insufficient internally generated funds may constrain future corporate investments. 
A firm is deemed as financially constrained when negative shocks decrease its 
investment spending. This is either because the firm cannot continue drawing from 
its relatively-inexpensive internal finances, or because lower collateral increases 
external financing costs (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
 
Aside from information asymmetry, other frictions (e.g., tax advantages, 
transaction costs, agency problems, and financial distress costs) could also contribute 
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to explaining why external capital costs more than internally generated funds. The 
design of the corporate tax systems has historically brought a cost advantage to 
internal finances over external finances. Moreover, new share issues of seasoned 
equity are associated with a variety of transaction costs, including underwriting 
discounts, registration fees, and administrative expenses. Costs associated with 
monitoring and controlling the agency problems also contribute to increasing the total 
costs of raising external capital. The agency costs of equity arise from conflicts 
between shareholders who are focused on wealth maximization and managers who 
are focused on maximizing their personal control and power. Similarly, the agency 
cost of debt arises from the debt contracts’ limited liability feature that incentivizes 
firm managers to make decisions that contradicts the lenders’ interests. Finally, 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs, which arises when a firm has difficulties 
meeting its payment obligations, also contribute to increasing external financing 
costs. 
 
1.2. An empirical overview: 
This section will briefly highlight some of the empirical studies that examine 
firms’ financial constraint status under different circumstances. The empirical 
findings suggest that certain firm-specific characteristics could potentially mitigate 
the severity of financial constraints by loosening the effects of agency problems and/or 
capital market imperfections. Examples of such characteristics include firms with 
concentrated institutional ownership, firms with management ownership, firms with 
high credit rating, dividend-paying firms, large mature firms, multidivisional firms, 
and bank-connected firms.  
 
1.2.1. Ownership structure:  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) focus on the conflict of interest that may occur 
between managers and shareholders. Managers have incentives to exploit firm assets 
for empire building or as perquisites. But managerial ownership may actually help 
align the interests of shareholders and managers, lowering agency and external 
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financing costs (Morck et al., 1988). However, as managerial ownership increases, 
monitoring managers becomes difficult because managers will have greater control 
over the company (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Hence, at lower percentages of 
managerial ownership, the incentive alignment effect is expected to mitigate firms’ 
financial constraints. But, after a certain percentage of managerial ownership, the 
entrenchment effect is expected to impair firms’ ability to raise external finances 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) imply that large stockholders with concentrated 
ownership have greater incentive to monitor the behavior of managers than minority 
stockholders. Hence, agency cost models predict that a more concentrated ownership 
structure decreases in the severity of financial constraints. Large stockholders, 
however, enjoy private control benefits that minority stockholders lack (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Consequently, large stockholders might have motives to hold more 
cash to consume their private control benefits (Faccio et al., 2001). Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) test which of the two ownership concentration effects (i.e., the monitoring 
effect or the private benefits effect) dominates the other. Their results suggest that 
concentrated ownership in itself insignificantly impacts firms’ cash holdings. 
However, their results indicate that controlling owners’ type impacts cash holdings. 
They find that controlling family firms are likely to hold more cash than controlling 
institutional firms. Furthermore, Faccio and Lang (2002) claim that controlling 
institutional owners are likely to provide more effective monitoring of the 
management than those of controlling family owners. The above studies suggest that, 
because they are better monitors, controlling institutional shareholders improve 
firms’ abilities to raise external finances. Controlling family owners, on the other 
hand, avoid high external financing costs by holding more cash. They may, in some 
cases, impair firms’ access to external capital due to the private benefit incentives 
certain family owners are subject to. 
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1.2.2. Dividend-paying firms: 
Noting that constrained companies are not in a condition to distribute 
considerable amounts of dividends, Fazzari et al. (1988) categorized companies based 
on their payout behavior and find that cash flow sensitivity of investment is higher 
for companies that retain almost-all their income. Hennessy and Whited (2007) 
divided their sample according to firm size and dividends payouts, then evaluate 
external financing costs across different types of firms. They find that both large firms 
and high-dividend paying firms are expected to bear lower external financing costs. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) indicate that companies with high dividends payout ratios 
have greater financial flexibility since they can internally raise the needed capital by 
cutting dividends. But dividends tend to be sticky, meaning that most companies are 
unwilling to cut specified dividends (Brav et al., 2005). This makes it hard for 
companies to rely on dividends cuts as a form of internal financing. Constraint-
inducing economic shocks, however, may force firms to cut dividends if the costs 
associated with dividends cuts are lower than external financing costs. The above 
studies suggest that high dividend-paying firms may indeed be less financially 
constrained, but there are costs associated with dividends cuts that restrain the 
reliance of such cuts. 
 
2.2.3. Large and mature firms and firms with high credit rating: 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) find that cash flow sensitivity of investment is 
greater in small firms and firms with neither commercial paper ratings nor bond 
ratings, while they do not find significant sensitivities for large firms and firms with 
credit ratings. Other studies grouping firms by size, age, and bond rating, also 
support the view that small, immature firms and firms with low credit ratings face 
limited access to external capital (e.g., Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Schaller, 
1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995). Consistent with these studies, Vasan and Srini 
(1987) find that internal finances are more volatile over the business cycle in smaller 
firms. They show that because smaller companies have limited access to external 
finances during downturns than larger companies, business recessions are likely to 
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have a higher impact on their growth rates and investment behavior. Finally, 
Brennan and Hughes (1991) imply that large companies have fewer information 
asymmetries than small companies, suggesting that small companies may face 
additional external financing costs (Whited, 1992; Kim et al., 1998). 
 
2.2.4. Multidivisional firms: 
Unlike specialized firms, diversified firms are expected to have non-core segment 
assets that can be sold, making them less susceptible to financial distress. Specialized 
firms, on the contrary, are often liquidated during financial distress (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Moreover, since divisions of diversified companies have imperfectly 
correlated cash flows, low growth divisions’ cash flows can be used to subsidize high 
growth low cash flow divisions (Subramaniam et al., 2011). The above arguments 
suggest that diversification has the effect of reducing the severity of firms’ financial 
constraints. Supporting this view, Tong (2011) documents that cash’s value is 
considerably lower in diversified companies than in specialized companies. In a more 
recent study, Erel et al. (2015) test the claim that acquisitions mitigate firms’ 
financial constraints in target firms. They find that target firms’ cash holdings, cash 
flow sensitivity of cash, and cash flow sensitivity of investment all decline, whereas 
investments increase following an acquisition. Likewise, Matvos et al. (2017) imply 
that diversified corporations increase their scope during times of rising external 
financial frictions. Their evidence supports the view that firms diversify in response 
to constraint-inducing capital markets. 
 
2.2.5. Bank-connected firms: 
Berlin and Loeys (1988) claim that bank lending can reduce agency problem and 
information asymmetry costs. This is primarily because banks have a comparative 
advantage in monitoring managers’ actions and in analyzing information. Supporting 
this view, Fama (1985) suggests that banks can access private information and collect 
information at lower costs. Furthermore, James (1987) imply that bank credit 
agreement announcements convey positive signals regarding the credit-worthiness of 
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the borrowing firms. These studies imply that firms with greater bank debt are likely 
to be less financially constrained. 
 
2.3. Cash holdings and financial constraints: 
Capital market imperfections explain why some companies hold sizeable amounts 
of cash despite the opportunity costs associated with such holdings. In addition to the 
opportunity cash-holding costs, Jensen (1986) suggests that entrenched managers 
may waste firms’ free cash flows by investing in nonprofitable projects. In view of 
this, Opler et al. (1999) suggest that management should set cash holdings at a level 
where the holdings marginal benefit equals the holdings marginal cost. The two 
major benefits of holding cash are emphasized by Keynes (1936), which are the costs 
and precautionary motives. The costs motive points out the capacity of a firm facing 
internal resource shortages to avoid additional costs associated with selling assets or 
raising external finances. The precautionary motive focuses on the costs resulting 
from unanticipated contingencies and foregone investments. More recently, 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) report that cash holdings marginal benefit is higher for 
firms with greater external financing costs than those with lower costs.1  
 
Fama and French (2001) claim that dividend payouts are negatively related to 
market to book ratio. In this view, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) propose high growth 
firms are likely to hold more cash to minimize foregone investment costs. Similarly, 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) suggest that the cash’s value is higher for companies 
with good investment opportunities. These studies imply that firms with greater 
external financing costs and firms with good investment opportunities should hold 
more cash.2 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See also Pinkowitz and Williamson (2006). 
2 See Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), and Almeida et al. (2011). 
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2.4. Leverage and financial constraints: 
One commonly used proxy for financial constraints is a firm’s leverage ratio. Due 
to bankruptcy costs, highly leveraged firms are likely to have greater external 
financing costs. Many financial constraints indexes (e.g., the Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) index, the Cleary (1999) index, and the Whited and Wu (2005) index) use low 
leverage as an indicator for firms being less constrained. However, as suggested by 
Hennessy and Whited (2007), the use of leverage, in this case, is misleading because 
if bankruptcy costs increase, firms will optimally substitute equity for debt making 
them falsely appear less constrained. Moreover, several studies cast doubts about the 
use of leverage as an indicator of firms’ financial constraints. Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) document that leverage's endogeneity feature can lead to a complex non-
monotonic relationship between financial constraints and leverage.  
 
In the same spirit, Almeida et al. (2011) point out that firms can be financially 
constrained during normal times even if they have low leverage ratios. Consider the 
case of a small firm in an emerging economy that have very limited access to external 
finances and hence chooses to have low levels of leverage. Large highly-leveraged US 
firm, on the other hand, may easily raise external capital to fund any profitable 
investment opportunity. Finally, some companies may deviate from their ideal capital 
structure and choose not to lever up for governance considerations (Strebulaev and 
Yang, 2013). After investigating the economic factors that motivate companies to 
become zero leveraged, Strebulaev and Yang indicate that family companies and 
companies with higher management ownership are expected to have lower levels of 
leverage. 
 
In an attempt to further examine the relation between leverage and financial 
constraints, several studies imply that leverage imposes constraints only for 
companies with weak growth opportunities (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 
2005). For diversified companies, Lang et al. (1996) document that leverage does not 
reduce growth for segments with strong growth opportunities but is negatively related 
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to growth for segments with weak growth prospects. This is because strong growth 
opportunities are expected to generate higher cash flows, allowing companies to 
easily refinance and recapitalize in the capital market. Weak growth opportunities, 
in the contrary, may not be sufficient to overcome the debt overhang problem or may 
not be recognized by external capital markets. Aivazian et al. (2005) document 
similar evidence using information on Canadian publicly traded companies. In 
contrast to these studies, McConnell and Servaes (1995) claim that leverage prompts 
underinvestment by showing that leverage is negatively related to corporate value 
for companies with strong growth prospects. McConnell and Servaes also imply that 
leverage mitigates overinvestment by reporting that leverage is positively related to 
corporate value for companies with weak growth prospects. Consistent with the 
underinvestment hypothesis, Acharya et al. (2007) suggest that constrained firms 
that anticipate strong growth prospects direct most of their excess cash flows towards 
reducing leverage. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses: 
Myers (1977) demonstrates that leverage increases the probability of financial 
distress and debt overhang, creating a tendency for firms to make decisions that are 
undesirable to debtholders. Moreover, Altman (1984) suggest that leverage can also 
result in direct and indirect bankruptcy costs, impairing access to external finances3. 
Hence, due to bankruptcy and financial distress costs, firms with high leverage 
outstanding are generally expected to have lower debt capacity and greater external 
financing costs. Based on these observations, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: On average, unlevered firms are expected to face lower financial constraints 
relative to levered firms, all things being equal. 
 
                                                 
3 As documented by Altman (1984), indirect bankruptcy costs can include profits that a firm is expected 
to earn if there was no bankruptcy potential. The direct bankruptcy costs consist of accounting, legal, 
and other managerial costs. 
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Brennan and Hughes (1991) suggest that as companies grow in size, their 
information asymmetries tend to decrease. This implies that small firms may face 
greater costs of debt financing because lenders cannot distinguish between good and 
bad investments (Whited, 1992; Kim et al., 1998). Moreover, Vasan and Srini (1987) 
find that smaller firms’ internal cash-flows are more volatile over the business cycle 
than in larger firms. Hence, smaller firms will have very limited access to credit 
during economic downturns because their likelihood of bankruptcy is higher. This 
suggests that small firms are expected to have financial constraint levels that are 
extremely vulnerable to their leverage levels4. Additionally, Titman and Wessels 
(1988) imply that large diversified firms have greater financial flexibility than small 
specialized firms, making them less likely to experience bankruptcy or financial 
distress5. This is because, if need be, large diversified firms are capable of (1) selling 
off some of their non-core segments or (2) subsidizing low-cash-generating-segments 
using funds from high-cash-generating-segments. This implies that large diversified 
firms' financial constraint levels are less prone to their leverage levels. Based on these 
observations, we suggest that: 
 
H2: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely 
to be weaker for larger firms relative to smaller firms. 
 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) suggest that firms that pay dividends are less financially 
constrained since they have the capacity for cutting back their dividends to fund 
profitable investments opportunities. Furthermore, Hennessy and Whited (2007) 
document that dividend-paying firms face lower costs of external capital relative to 
zero-dividend firms. Moreover, Fazzari et al. (1988) imply that dividend-paying firms’ 
cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower compared to zero-dividend firms. Lastly, 
                                                 
4 Schaller (1993), Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Chirinko and Schaller (1995), and Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) also document evidence suggesting that smaller firms have lower capital access relative 
to larger firms. 
5 Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) and Matvos et al. (2017) also document evidence suggesting that 
diversified corporations are less financially constrained relative stand-alone companies. 
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noting that they enjoy greater flexibility in dealing with financial contingencies, the 
bankruptcy likelihoods of firms that pay dividends are expected to be lower relative 
to zero-dividend firms. This indicates that dividend-paying firms' financial constraint 
levels are less susceptible to their leverage levels. Based on these observations, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely 
to be weaker for dividend-paying firms compared to zero-dividend firms. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) claim that there is a consensus that leverage tends to 
increase with fixed tangible assets. This is because tangible assets are in effect better 
collateral. Moreover, firms with valuable tangible assets enjoy greater financial 
flexibility because they can sell off some of their less-efficient assets to meet debt 
obligations or to finance good investment opportunities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
Hence, tangible assets decrease firms’ bankruptcy likelihoods. This suggests that 
firms with high tangibility have financial constraints that are less sensitive to their 
leverage levels. Based on these observations, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely 
to be weaker for firms with high tangibility compared to firms with low tangibility. 
 
Myers’ (1977) debt overhang theory explains how corporate leverage can reduce 
firms’ value by weakening their incentive to undertake good future investments. This 
happens because part of the investments’ profits must first be collected by debt-
holders, leaving equity-holders with lower profits6. Myers also explains why 
managers often set firms’ target leverage ratios relative to book as opposed to market 
values. This is because the amount of corporate leverage collateralized by existing 
assets will be more than is collateralized by future growth. Consistent with the debt 
                                                 
6 or no profits in cases when the debt overhang is significant and/or when profits are low. 
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overhang theory, Lang et al. (1995) document a negative relation between future 
growth and leverage that holds regardless of which proxies used to estimate growth7. 
Hence, based on the view that growth opportunities may not be regarded as adequate 
collateral, may not be sufficient to overcome the debt overhang problem, or may not 
be recognized by external capital markets, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: All things being equal, the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely 
to be weaker for value firms compared to growth firms. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
We use merged annual Compustat and CRSP for our accounting and financial 
dataset over the period 1965–2017. We exclude financial, utility, non-US, and non-
publicly traded firms8. Following most recent capital structure papers9, the book 
leverage ratio in year t of firm i is defined as follows:  
 
𝐵𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
                  (1) 
 
Where AT refers to total assets. DLTT refers to long-term debt and DLC refers to 
short-term debt. The market leverage ratio in year t of firm i is defined as follows: 
 
𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + (𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹𝑖𝑡)
                  (2) 
 
                                                 
7 Aivazian and Qiu (2005) and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) also suggest that leverage is negatively 
associated with firms' future investments and growth. 
8 We exclude SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 for financial firms and codes from 4900 to 4999 for utility 
firms. Firms with FIC not equal to “USA” are also excluded. Finally, non-publicly traded firms with 
STKO equal to one and two are excluded as well. 
9 See Lemmon et al. (2008); Lemmon and Zender (2010); Leary and Roberts (2010); Graham and Leary 
(2010); and Strebulaev and Yang (2013). 
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Where CSHO refers to year-end share price and PRCC_F refers to year-end shares 
outstanding. Following, we present the two approaches used for assessing the level 
of financial constraints in ZL and AZL firms. 
 
4.1. Cash flow sensitivity of cash: 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) posit a model in which cash-to-cash-flow 
sensitivity can be used to measure a firm’s financial constraint status. They imply 
that constrained firms’ cash savings should increase when cash flows are greater, 
while unconstrained firms’ cash holdings are unassociated to changes in cash flows. 
Almeida et al. categorize firms according to constraint indicators using five 
alternative methods: asset size, dividend payout ratios, commercial paper ratings, 
bond ratings, and the KZ index. They find, for each of the first four methods, that 
cash flow sensitivity of cash is almost-zero for unconstrained firms, but positive for 
constrained firms Almeida.  
 
Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Erel et al. (2015), the 
dependent variable of our regression is the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio. We use 
the subsequent regression to assess the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash: 
 
∆( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗=4
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                   (5) 
 
Where ZL is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is 
unlevered and zero otherwise. 𝛿𝑠 are sector binary variables controlling for sector 
fixed effects; 𝛿𝑡 are year binary variables controlling for year fixed effects. We include 
various firm-specific variables to control for other variables affecting the change in 
the cash-to-assets’ ratio. Namely, we include total assets, equity capitalization, age, 
number of employees, sales growth, market-to-book ratio, sales-to-assets, dividend-
to-assets, dividend binary variable, cash-to-assets, investment-to-assets, asset sale-
to-assets, EBITDA-to-assets, share repurchases-to-assets, taxes paid-to-assets, 
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tangibility, and R&D-to-sales. We expect the coefficient on the ZL binary variable 
interacted with cash flow to be negative, indicating that unlevered firms are more 
likely to have lower cash flow sensitivity of cash (i.e., lower financial constraints) 
compared to leveraged firms. 
 
Next, to test whether the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for 
larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value firms, we 
use the following three-way-interacted-multivariate regression: 
 
∆( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛽7 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗=8
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                   (6) 
 
Where 3rdI is the third interacted binary variable. Our tests require for the above 
regression to have four separate formats. In the first format, we test whether the ZL 
effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for larger firms relative to smaller firms. 
Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s total assets value is above the mean 
sample’s total assets and zero otherwise. In the second format, we test whether the 
ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for dividend-paying firms relative 
to zero-dividend firms. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation has positive 
dividend and zero otherwise. In the third format, we test whether the ZL effect on 
cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for firms with high tangibility relative to firms 
with low tangibility. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s fixed-assets-
to-assets ratio is above the mean sample’s ratio and zero otherwise. In the last format, 
we test whether the ZL effect on cash flow sensitivity of cash is lower for value firms 
relative to growth firms. Here, 3rdI equals one if a firm-year observation’s market-
to-book ratio is below the mean sample’s ratio and zero otherwise 
 
In all three formats, we expect the three-way-interacted-coefficient, 𝛽7 , to be 
negative. This indicates that the ZL effect on firms’ cash flow sensitivity of cash is 
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weaker for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value 
firms. 
 
4.2. Cash flow sensitivity of investment: 
Fazzari et al. (1988) develop a model in which financial constraints is measured 
by firms’ investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity. The idea is that for a financially 
constrained firm, cash flow growths will allow it to take on more investments. 
Unconstrained firms’ investments, on the contrary, will not change with changes in 
cash flows. Here, we use a similar model as for the cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity with 
only one change. Namely, we use investment-to-assets ratio as the dependent 
variable rather than the change in the ratio of cash-to-assets. 
 
( 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )
𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗=2
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                (7) 
 
Again, we expect the coefficient on ZL binary variable, 𝛽3 , interacted with cash 
flow-to-assets to be negative, indicating that unleveraged firms have, on average, 
lower investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity relative to leveraged firms. Additionally, 
we run four formats of the three-way-interacted-multivariate regression to test 
whether the ZL effect on investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity is lower for larger firms, 
dividend-paying firms, firms with high tangibility, and value firms.  
 
( 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )
𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7 (𝑍𝐿𝑖𝑡)( 3𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡)( 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 )𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗=8
+ 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                  (8) 
 
We expect the three-way interacted coefficient, 𝛽7 , to be negative in all four 
formats, indicating that the ZL effect on firms’ cash flow sensitivity of investment is 
weaker for larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with higher proportions of 
tangible assets, and value firms. 
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TABLE 1.1: YEARLY FREQUENCIES OF ZL AND AZL FIRMS 
 
This table displays the yearly frequencies of ZL and AZL firms from 1965 to 2017.  ZL (zero leveraged) firms are 
firms that have a yearly book leverage ratio of zero. AZL (almost-zero-leveraged) firms are firms that have a 
yearly book leverage ratio below 5%. Column Obs. reports the number of firms in a given year in the sample. 
Financial firms, utility firms, non-US firms, and non-publicly traded firms are excluded. 
 
Year ZL AZL Obs.  Year ZL AZL Obs. 
1965 0.1053 0.2040 1539  1992 0.0952 0.2253 4190 
1966 0.0918 0.1669 1678  1993 0.1059 0.2439 4543 
1967 0.0767 0.1467 1813  1994 0.1097 0.2437 4851 
1968 0.0628 0.1381 2231  1995 0.1138 0.2527 5402 
1969 0.0546 0.1165 2454  1996 0.1257 0.2799 5737 
1970 0.0468 0.1016 2520  1997 0.1290 0.2885 5751 
1971 0.0492 0.1132 2641  1998 0.1277 0.2700 5738 
1972 0.0512 0.1217 2793  1999 0.1281 0.2858 5692 
1973 0.0443 0.1027 2932  2000 0.1355 0.3028 5367 
1974 0.0367 0.0902 3270  2001 0.1422 0.2998 4796 
1975 0.0453 0.1175 3243  2002 0.1555 0.3052 4522 
1976 0.0468 0.1212 3267  2003 0.1748 0.3220 4366 
1977 0.0478 0.1231 3242  2004 0.1871 0.3419 4308 
1978 0.0416 0.1110 3171  2005 0.1951 0.3520 4275 
1979 0.0397 0.1048 3120  2006 0.1980 0.3457 4157 
1980 0.0412 0.1110 3152  2007 0.1963 0.3516 4030 
1981 0.0483 0.1260 3207  2008 0.1877 0.3204 3830 
1982 0.0458 0.1327 3300  2009 0.1959 0.3428 3670 
1983 0.0544 0.1720 3494  2010 0.2029 0.3640 3549 
1984 0.0497 0.1502 3483  2011 0.2073 0.3464 3487 
1985 0.0520 0.1477 3595  2012 0.2022 0.3283 3457 
1986 0.0573 0.1531 3737  2013 0.2059 0.3221 3487 
1987 0.0621 0.1566 3799  2014 0.2025 0.3096 3437 
1988 0.0576 0.1478 3695  2015 0.1954 0.2967 3317 
1989 0.0635 0.1553 3637  2016 0.1905 0.2888 3165 
1990 0.0703 0.1730 3671  2017 0.1924 0.2860 2989 
1991 0.0837 0.2007 3847  Average 0.1153 0.2318 - 
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FIGURE 1.1: YEARLY FREQUENCIES OF ZL AND AZL FIRMS 
 
This figure displays the fraction of ZL and AZL firms across the years from 1965 to 2017.  ZL (zero leveraged) 
firms are firms that have a yearly book leverage ratio of zero. AZL (almost-zero-leveraged) firms are firms that 
have a yearly book leverage ratio below 5%. Financial firms, utility firms, non-US firms, and non-publicly traded 
firms are excluded. 
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5. Results: 
This section highlights the sample descriptive statistics and reports the results of 
the two models described in the previous section. 
 
Table 1 and figure 1 report the yearly proportions of unlevered firms from 1965 to 
2017. On average, 11.5% of our entire sample yearly firm observations are unlevered, 
from a minimum of 3.7% in 1974 to a maximum of 20.7% in 2011. An upward trend 
on the ZL behavior that lasted three decades (i.e., from 1980 to 2010) seems very 
clear. Over the period from 2000 to 2017, the average unlevered yearly firm 
observation is 18.7%, compared to only 4.8% from 1970 to 1987. This signifies how 
substantial the change in US firms leverage behavior over the past four decades. 
Following previous studies10, we also report the yearly fraction of firms that are 
almost-zero-leveraged (hereafter, AZL). AZL firms are firms that have a book 
leverage ratio of less than 5%. On average, 23.1% of our entire sample yearly firm 
observations are AZL. About 33% can be categorized as AZL over the period from 
2000 to 2017, compared to only 12.5% from 1970 to 1987. Similar to the ZL behavior, 
there is an impressive rising AZL behavior trend over the past four decades, from a 
minimum of 9% in 1974 to a maximum of 36.4% in 2010. 
 
Table 2 reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 194,644 yearly 
observations from 1965 to 2017. For each variable, the mean, median, and standard 
deviation values are reported. The last column reports the difference between the 
mean value of unleveraged and leveraged firms. The numbers in parentheses are p-
values associated with the parametric two-sample t-test. Leveraged firms’ average 
leverage ratio is 30%. Moreover, on average, unlevered firms have total assets of 
about $316 million, whereas levered firms have total assets of about $1,719 million.  
The difference in total assets between the mean value of unleveraged and leveraged 
firms is $1,403 million and is statistically significant. Again, equity capitalization is  
                                                 
10 See Leland and Toft, 1996; Fischer et al., 1989; Goldstein et al., 2001; Ju et al., 2005; Strebulaev 
and Yang, 2013. 
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TABLE 1.2: ZL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 197,388 yearly observations from 1965 to 2017. For 
each variable, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported. Total assets and equity 
capitalization are reported in million USD. Values for the number of employees are reported in million units. The 
last column reports the difference between the mean value of unleveraged and leveraged firms. The numbers in 
parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample t-test. 
 
 Zero Leverage Firms  Leveraged Firms  Significance tests 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Median  Obs. Mean SD Median  
Difference in 
means 
Leverage Ratio 22808 0.000 0.000 0.000  174580 0.302 0.294 0.258  
.302 
(0.0000) 
Total Assets 22808 315.896 2270 66.849  174580 1718.7 12303 116.718  
1402.818 
(0.0000) 
Equity Capitalization 20908 987.594 10465 129.322  155729 1895.2 12864 93.307  
907.652 
(0.0000) 
Age 22808 17.989 12.494 16.000  174580 22.421 15.103 19.000  
4.432 
(0.0000) 
Number of Employees 22585 2.545 17.525 0.350  172982 8.793 37.751 1.401  
6.248 
(0.0000) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 20871 2.821 3.466 1.988  155402 1.778 4.118 1.395  
-1.043 
(0.0000) 
Sales Growth 19333 0.099 0.599 0.094  158744 0.115 0.422 0.090  
.016 
(0.0000) 
Sales-to-Assets 22798 1.114 1.596 0.894  174538 1.327 1.064 1.169  
.213 
(0.0000) 
Dividend Binary Variable 22808 0.291 0.454 0.000  174580 0.415 0.493 0.000  
.124 
(0.0000) 
Dividend-to-Assets 22801 0.022 0.098 0.000  174551 0.011 0.043 0.000  
-.010 
(0.0000) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets  21244 0.016 0.278 0.077  158687 0.049 0.178 0.078  
.033 
(0.0000) 
Cash-to-Assets  22808 0.399 0.271 0.350  174580 0.127 0.173 0.060  
-.273 
(0.0000) 
Investment-to-Assets  22347 0.049 0.068 0.029  170942 0.072 0.082 0.048  
.022 
(0.0000) 
Asset Sale-to-Assets 22808 0.065 0.326 0.000  174580 0.020 0.121 0.000  
-.045 
(0.0000) 
EBITDA-to-Assets 22547 0.031 0.383 0.097  173671 0.091 0.201 0.121  
.060 
(0.0000) 
Share Repurchases-to-Assets 22808 0.019 0.075 0.000  174580 0.011 0.058 0.000  
-.008 
(0.0000) 
Taxes Paid-to-Assets 22652 0.035 0.068 0.017  174193 0.026 0.044 0.019  
-.009 
(0.0000) 
Tangibility 22783 0.165 0.183 0.097  174255 0.316 0.229 0.265  
.150 
(0.0000) 
R&D-to-Sales 21435 5.102 134.113 0.033  173313 1.052 74.827 0.000  
-4.050 
(0.0000) 
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TABLE 1.3: AZL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 197,388 yearly observations from 1965 to 2017. For 
each variable, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported. Total assets and equity 
capitalization are reported in million USD. Values for the number of employees are reported in million units. The 
last column reports the difference between the mean value of almost-zero-leveraged and leveraged firms. The 
numbers in parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample t-test. 
 
 Almost Zero Leverage Firms  Leveraged Firms  Significance tests 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Median  Obs. Mean SD Median  
Difference in 
means 
Leverage Ratio 45754 0.010 0.014 0.000  151634 0.345 0.293 0.293  
.336 
(0.0000) 
Total Assets 45754 482 4666 73.942  151634 1881 12972 125.803  
1398.78 
(0.0000) 
Equity Capitalization 42086 1185 12357 132.133  134551 1976 12680 86.454  
791.543 
(0.0000) 
Age 45754 18.859 13.240 16.000  151634 22.829 15.237 20.000  
3.971 
(0.0000) 
Number of Employees 45349 3.706 23.055 0.461  150218 9.390 39.045 1.589  
5.684 
(0.0000) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 42024 2.693 3.217 1.933  134249 1.654 4.260 1.348  
-1.039 
(0.0000) 
Sales Growth 39483 0.122 0.564 0.103  138594 0.111 0.404 0.088  
-.012 
(0.0000) 
Sales-to-Assets 45742 1.173 1.350 0.985  151594 1.342 1.066 1.182  
.169 
(0.0000) 
Dividend Binary Variable 45754 0.302 0.459 0.000  151634 0.430 0.495 0.000  
.128 
(0.0000) 
Dividend-to-Assets 45740 0.017 0.077 0.000  151612 0.011 0.042 0.000  
-.006 
(0.0000) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets  42864 0.025 0.251 0.080  137067 0.051 0.170 0.077  
.026 
(0.0000) 
Cash-to-Assets  45754 0.348 0.263 0.284  151634 0.101 0.143 0.050  
-.247 
(0.0000) 
Investment-to-Assets  44938 0.054 0.066 0.035  148351 0.074 0.084 0.049  
.020 
(0.0000) 
Asset Sale-to-Assets 45754 0.049 0.271 0.000  151634 0.018 0.103 0.000  
-.031 
(0.0000) 
EBITDA-to-Assets 45375 0.046 0.329 0.107  150843 0.096 0.189 0.122  
.050 
(0.0000) 
Share Repurchases-to-Assets 45754 0.016 0.076 0.000  151634 0.010 0.055 0.000  
-.006 
(0.0000) 
Taxes Paid-to-Assets 45560 0.036 0.062 0.021  151285 0.024 0.041 0.018  
-.011 
(0.0000) 
Tangibility 45703 0.184 0.183 0.122  151335 0.333 0.230 0.285  
.149 
(0.0000) 
R&D-to-Sales 43939 3.647 99.313 0.019  150809 0.871 78.216 0.000  
-2.776 
(0.0000) 
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higher for leveraged firms. Moreover, age denotes the total years since a firm’s 
information first appeared in Compustat over the period from 1965 to 2017. The 
average age of leveraged firms is about 22.5 years, whereas it is only 18 years for 
unleveraged firms. Further, it seems that ZL firms are in general high growth firms. 
ZL firms have, on average, a market-to-book ratio of 2.8, whereas leveraged firms’ 
market-to-book ratio is 1.8. Additionally, relative to leveraged firms, unleveraged 
firms do not often pay dividends. But, when unleveraged firms do pay dividends, they 
are expected to pay higher dividends compared to leveraged firms. These findings are 
consistent with Strebulaev and Yang (2013) who report that unleveraged dividend-
paying firms effectively replace payout to debt-holders with payout to equity-holders. 
 
In summary, compared to levered firms, unlevered firms are on average smaller 
and younger. They are also less likely to have greater revenue, revenue growth, cash 
flows, investments, and fixed tangible assets; but they are more likely to have greater 
growth opportunities, dividends, cash holdings, asset sales, tax expenses, and R&D 
expenses. Table 3 indicates that AZL firms exhibit patterns similar to those of ZL 
firms. 
 
Table 4 reports the coefficient values of a two-way-interacted regression. The 
dependent variable for columns one to four is the change in the cash-to-assets ratio. 
ZL is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is unlevered and 
zero otherwise. In this two-way interacted regression, the coefficient on cash-flow-to-
assets on columns one to four signifies the cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity for leveraged 
firms, and the sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on the ZL binary variable 
interacted with cash-flow-to-assets denotes the sensitivity for unleveraged firms. For 
example, column one indicates that levered firms’ cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity equals 
6.75, while the sensitivity for unlevered firms equals 5.7 or (6.75 plus -1.05). Hence, 
consistent with our first hypothesis, the results show that the interacted coefficient 
is negative and is statistically significant, signifying that unlevered firms have a  
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TABLE 1.4: ZL TWO-WAY-INTERACTED-REGRESSIONS 
 
This table displays estimates of several two-way-interacted-regressions in which the dependent variables are the 
change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio in columns five 
to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is unlevered and zero 
otherwise. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets signify the sensitivities for leveraged firms. The coefficients on 
cash-flow-to-assets interacted with the ZL binary variable signify the change in the sensitivities for unleveraged 
firms. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have 
a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -1.0451*** -1.0431*** -1.7501*** -1.6406***  -0.0083*** -0.0172*** -0.0194*** -0.0176*** 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.7540*** 6.7312*** 5.6798*** 5.2667***  0.0451*** 0.0648*** 0.0322*** 0.0356*** 
ZL 0.1037*** 0.1017*** 0.1967*** 0.1570***  -0.0011** -0.0032*** -0.0033*** -0.0110*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0721*** 0.0745*** 0.1080*** 0.1337***  -0.0127*** -0.0173*** -0.0166*** -0.0157*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0664*** -0.0687*** -0.1039*** -0.1300***  0.0126*** 0.0136*** 0.0128*** 0.0106*** 
Age 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0041  0.0000 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0053*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0196*** -0.0195*** -0.0235*** -0.0214***  -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
Sales Growth 0.4593*** 0.4601*** 0.3916*** 0.3665***  0.0115*** 0.0114*** 0.0105*** 0.0108*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0041 -0.0035 -0.0201*** -0.0088**  0.0014*** -0.0050*** -0.0054*** -0.0046*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0612*** -0.0635*** -0.0735***   -0.0060*** -0.0026*** -0.0027***  
Dividend-to-Assets -0.6663*** -0.6646*** -0.7458***   -0.0209*** -0.0201*** -0.0252***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3583*** -0.3591*** -0.2533***   -0.0071*** -0.0547*** -0.0496***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5919*** -1.6255*** -1.5464***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0493*** 0.0498***    0.0127*** 0.0098***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.3772*** -1.4623***    -0.0364*** -0.0377***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6041*** -0.6074***    -0.0161*** -0.0189***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.3830***     0.0524***    
Tangibility -0.0468**     0.1915***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0386**     0.0000***    
Observations 108,622 108,673 108,811 109,686  151,613 151,747 151,999 152,000 
R-squared 0.1976 0.1973 0.1772 0.1626  0.4599 0.3354 0.3312 0.3226 
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TABLE 1.5: AZL TWO-WAY-INTERACTED-REGRESSIONS 
 
This table displays estimates of several two-way-interacted-regressions in which the dependent variables are the 
change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio in columns five 
to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation has a leverage 
ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets signify the sensitivities for leveraged 
firms. The coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets interacted with the AZL binary variable signify the change in the 
sensitivities for AZL firms. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts 
***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.8005*** -0.8029*** -1.3079*** -1.1796***  -0.0087*** -0.0157*** -0.0185*** -0.0142*** 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.8265*** 6.8064*** 5.7704*** 5.3342***  0.0465*** 0.0673*** 0.0354*** 0.0378*** 
AZL 0.0530*** 0.0512*** 0.1191*** 0.0889***  -0.0004 -0.0039*** -0.0037*** -0.0111*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0682*** 0.0702*** 0.1031*** 0.1278***  -0.0127*** -0.0175*** -0.0169*** -0.0164*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0639*** -0.0659*** -0.1008*** -0.1256***  0.0126*** 0.0138*** 0.0130*** 0.0113*** 
Age 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0037  0.0000 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0052*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0197*** -0.0197*** -0.0236*** -0.0216***  -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
Sales Growth 0.4589*** 0.4600*** 0.3928*** 0.3672***  0.0115*** 0.0113*** 0.0104*** 0.0108*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.0195*** -0.0084**  0.0014*** -0.0049*** -0.0053*** -0.0045*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0609*** -0.0630*** -0.0728***   -0.0061*** -0.0026*** -0.0027***  
Dividend-to-Assets -0.6945*** -0.6923*** -0.7886***   -0.0212*** -0.0205*** -0.0255***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3303*** -0.3293*** -0.2247***   -0.0073*** -0.0530*** -0.0480***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5999*** -1.6347*** -1.5536***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0504*** 0.0508***    0.0127*** 0.0097***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.3854*** -1.4590***    -0.0363*** -0.0374***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6150*** -0.6180***    -0.0164*** -0.0195***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.3361***     0.0530***    
Tangibility -0.0465**     0.1915***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0462     0.0000***    
Observations 108,622 108,673 108,811 109,686  151,613 151,747 151,999 152,000 
R-squared 0.1977 0.1974 0.1766 0.1619  0.4599 0.3357 0.3315 0.3239 
 
 26 
lower cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity (i.e., unlevered firms are less financially 
constrained). 
 
We also report investment-to-cash-flow sensitivities on columns five to eight, 
where the dependent variable for these columns is the investment-to-assets ratio. 
Similar to the first four columns, the coefficients on cash-flow-to-assets on the last 
four columns denote the investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity for leveraged firms, 
while the sum of this coefficient and the interacted coefficient represents the 
sensitivity for unleveraged firms. Column five indicates that levered firms’ 
investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity equals 0.0451, whereas the sensitivity for 
unlevered firms equals 0.0368 or (0.0451 plus -0.0083). The results are statistically 
significant and supports our first hypothesis. Table 5 documents similar evidence for 
AZL firms. 
 
Table 6 reports the coefficient values of a three-way-interacted-multivariate 
regression. Similar to tables 4, the first four columns signify the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash while the last four columns signify the cash flow sensitivity of investment. 
But, in tables 6, we are testing whether the ZL effect on cash- and investment-to-
cash-flow sensitivities is different for larger firms compared to smaller firms. To do 
that, we include a third-interacted binary variable, Large, that equals one if a firm-
year has total assets greater than average and zero otherwise. In this specification, a 
negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on a firm’s 
financial constraints is weaker for larger firms, while a positive coefficient suggests 
a stronger effect. Consistent with our second hypothesis, the findings show that the 
three-way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all 
eight columns. This implies that the ZL effect on firms’ cash- and investment-to-cash-
flow sensitivities is weaker for larger firms relative to smaller firms. Table 7 reports 
consistent evidence for AZL firms. 
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TABLE 1.6: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH LARGE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is 
unlevered and zero otherwise. Large is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has total assets greater 
than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on 
sensitivities is weaker for larger firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector 
fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance 
level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.4922*** 6.4666*** 5.4746*** 5.0530***  0.0387*** 0.0476*** 0.0216*** 0.0246*** 
ZL 0.0448** 0.0421** 0.0494** 0.0099  0.0001 -0.0031*** -0.0034*** -0.0112*** 
ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.6299*** -0.6280*** -0.8415*** -0.8516***  -0.0065*** -0.0138*** -0.0147*** -0.0137*** 
Large -0.0066 -0.0045 0.0416*** 0.0600***  -0.0067*** -0.0110*** -0.0111*** -0.0111*** 
Large × Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.4366*** 0.4308*** 0.1240* 0.0000  0.0244*** 0.0678*** 0.0710*** 0.0709*** 
Large × ZL 0.0739*** 0.0726*** 0.2259*** 0.1974***  0.0018* 0.0061*** 0.0073*** 0.0089*** 
Large × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.6455*** -0.6384*** -1.5576*** -1.2553***  -0.0119** -0.0208*** -0.0302*** -0.0300*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0355*** -0.0371*** -0.0586*** -0.0745***  0.0074*** 0.0064*** 0.0059*** 0.0043*** 
Age 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0292*** 0.0302*** 0.0414*** 0.0520***  -0.0055*** -0.0040*** -0.0037*** -0.0018*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0267*** -0.0270*** -0.0342*** -0.0350***  0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 
Sales Growth 0.4567*** 0.4572*** 0.3778*** 0.3468***  0.0123*** 0.0127*** 0.0121*** 0.0124*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0418*** -0.0352***  0.0037*** -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.0018*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0638*** -0.0667*** -0.0782***   -0.0058*** -0.0022*** -0.0024***  
Dividend-to-Assets -0.6949*** -0.6931*** -0.8170***   -0.0200*** -0.0196*** -0.0240***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3818*** -0.3853*** -0.2833***   -0.0033*** -0.0489*** -0.0450***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.6498*** -1.6894*** -1.6394***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0573*** 0.0585***    0.0115*** 0.0081***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.4399*** -1.5495***    -0.0332*** -0.0287***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6073*** -0.6108***    -0.0188*** -0.0254***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.4757***     0.0722***    
Tangibility -0.0526***     0.1941***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0415     0.0000***    
Observations 108,622 108,673 108,811 109,686  151,613 151,747 151,999 152,000 
R-squared 0.1966 0.1962 0.1747 0.1580  0.4532 0.3250 0.3218 0.3147 
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TABLE 1.7: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH LARGE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation 
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Large is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has 
total assets greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the 
AZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for larger firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year 
and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical 
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.4644*** 6.4428*** 5.5000*** 5.0724***  0.0392*** 0.0487*** 0.0232*** 0.0257*** 
AZL -0.0180 -0.0204 -0.0067 -0.0368**  0.0017*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0101*** 
AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.2742*** -0.2774*** -0.5408*** -0.5133***  -0.0064*** -0.0118*** -0.0129*** -0.0099*** 
Large -0.0240** -0.0220* 0.0271** 0.0465***  -0.0070*** -0.0117*** -0.0119*** -0.0123*** 
Large × Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.6235*** 0.6180*** 0.2479*** 0.1025  0.0269*** 0.0719*** 0.0757*** 0.0752*** 
Large × AZL 0.0930*** 0.0922*** 0.1753*** 0.1527***  0.0018** 0.0055*** 0.0063*** 0.0079*** 
Large × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.8671*** -0.8653*** -1.3031*** -1.0559***  -0.0141*** -0.0229*** -0.0305*** -0.0289*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0350*** -0.0363*** -0.0572*** -0.0716***  0.0073*** 0.0064*** 0.0059*** 0.0045*** 
Age 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0280*** 0.0287*** 0.0398*** 0.0485***  -0.0055*** -0.0039*** -0.0037*** -0.0020*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0263*** -0.0265*** -0.0337*** -0.0343***  0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 
Sales Growth 0.4569*** 0.4578*** 0.3795*** 0.3479***  0.0123*** 0.0127*** 0.0121*** 0.0124*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0157*** -0.0154*** -0.0398*** -0.0330***  0.0037*** -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.0017*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0635*** -0.0661*** -0.0772***   -0.0058*** -0.0023*** -0.0024***  
Dividend-to-Assets -0.7289*** -0.7265*** -0.8492***   -0.0205*** -0.0204*** -0.0248***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3458*** -0.3460*** -0.2399***   -0.0049*** -0.0491*** -0.0452***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.6533*** -1.6952*** -1.6405***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0585*** 0.0596***    0.0114*** 0.0080***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.4504*** -1.5446***    -0.0330*** -0.0283***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6226*** -0.6257***    -0.0188*** -0.0257***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.4128***     0.0715***    
Tangibility -0.0534***     0.1942***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0484     0.0000***    
Observations 108,622 108,673 108,811 109,686  151,613 151,747 151,999 152,000 
R-squared 0.1971 0.1967 0.1745 0.1579  0.4533 0.3250 0.3219 0.3151 
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TABLE 1.8: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH DIVIDEND AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is 
unlevered and zero otherwise. Dividend is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has paid dividends and 
zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for 
dividend paying firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector fixed effects are 
included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of one 
percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.7405*** 6.7323*** 5.8073*** 5.4402***  0.0429*** 0.0558*** 0.0232*** 0.0260*** 
ZL 0.0240 0.0234 0.1818*** 0.1413***  0.0002 -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0100*** 
ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.5047*** -0.5091*** -1.7015*** -1.5406***  -0.0046** -0.0105*** -0.0121*** -0.0112*** 
Dividend -0.0757*** -0.0731*** -0.0418*** -0.0354***  -0.0080*** -0.0123*** -0.0126*** -0.0119*** 
Dividend × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.0379 -0.0791 -0.4753*** -0.4428***  0.0197*** 0.0960*** 0.0977*** 0.0871*** 
Dividend × ZL 0.2289*** 0.2249*** 0.0624** 0.0700**  -0.0024 0.0037** 0.0032* 0.0048*** 
Dividend × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -1.5020*** -1.4799*** -0.3407** -0.3143*  -0.0206** -0.0686*** -0.0709*** -0.0679*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0729*** 0.0751*** 0.1076*** 0.1313***  -0.0126*** -0.0164*** -0.0158*** -0.0134*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0668*** -0.0689*** -0.1035*** -0.1204***  0.0124*** 0.0129*** 0.0120*** 0.0104*** 
Age 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0012***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0046  0.0000 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0204*** -0.0204*** -0.0245*** -0.0233***  -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
Sales Growth 0.4635*** 0.4640*** 0.3956*** 0.3546***  0.0115*** 0.0116*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0046 -0.0040 -0.0206***   0.0014*** -0.0052*** -0.0056***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3596*** -0.3601*** -0.2527***   -0.0076*** -0.0562*** -0.0512***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5866*** -1.6188*** -1.5341***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0462*** 0.0467***    0.0127*** 0.0098***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.4043*** -1.4812***    -0.0360*** -0.0371***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.5952*** -0.5979***    -0.0170*** -0.0238***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.3576***     0.0484***    
Tangibility -0.0444**     0.1910***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0368***     0.0000***    
Observations 108,623 108,674 108,812 109,686  151,614 151,748 152,000 152,000 
R-squared 0.1975 0.1972 0.1765 0.1645  0.4599 0.3378 0.3337 0.3234 
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TABLE 1.9: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH DIVIDEND AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation 
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Dividend is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has 
paid dividends and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the AZL effect on 
sensitivities is weaker for dividend paying firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year 
and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical 
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.7553*** 6.7478*** 5.8431*** 5.4573***  0.0435*** 0.0576*** 0.0256*** 0.0280*** 
AZL -0.0143 -0.0151 0.0922*** 0.0587***  0.0010** -0.0029*** -0.0026*** -0.0107*** 
AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.3083*** -0.3127*** -1.1178*** -0.9572***  -0.0047** -0.0102*** -0.0123*** -0.0103*** 
Dividend -0.0914*** -0.0892*** -0.0566*** -0.0521***  -0.0079*** -0.0122*** -0.0126*** -0.0122*** 
Dividend × Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.1008 0.0667 -0.3388*** -0.2991***  0.0223*** 0.0983*** 0.1005*** 0.0905*** 
Dividend × AZL 0.1981*** 0.1960*** 0.0941*** 0.1063***  -0.0026** 0.0016 0.0013 0.0040*** 
Dividend × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -1.3890*** -1.3803*** -0.6540*** -0.6681***  -0.0175** -0.0460*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0689*** 0.0707*** 0.1029*** 0.1257***  -0.0126*** -0.0167*** -0.0161*** -0.0142*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0644*** -0.0661*** -0.1006*** -0.1163***  0.0124*** 0.0131*** 0.0122*** 0.0111*** 
Age 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0012***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
ln (Number of Employees) 0.0019 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0044  0.0001 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0038*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0206*** -0.0206*** -0.0247*** -0.0234***  -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
Sales Growth 0.4632*** 0.4641*** 0.3970*** 0.3550***  0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0203***   0.0014*** -0.0051*** -0.0055***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3323*** -0.3312*** -0.2253***   -0.0081*** -0.0544*** -0.0497***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5903*** -1.6237*** -1.5396***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0473*** 0.0478***    0.0127*** 0.0098***   
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.4132*** -1.4781***    -0.0359*** -0.0368***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6066*** -0.6090***    -0.0173*** -0.0243***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.3056***     0.0495***    
Tangibility -0.0438**     0.1910***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0416     0.0000***    
Observations 108,623 108,674 108,812 109,686  151,614 151,748 152,000 152,000 
R-squared 0.1976 0.1974 0.1760 0.1640  0.4600 0.3380 0.3339 0.3246 
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Similar to table 6, table 8 also reports the coefficient values of a three-way-
interacted-multivariate regression with the first four columns denoting the cash-to-
cash-flow sensitivity and the last four columns denoting the investment-to-cash-flow 
sensitivity. But, in tables 8, we are testing whether the ZL effect is different for 
dividend-paying firms relative to zero-dividend firms. Here, our third-interaction 
binary variable, Dividend, equals one if a firm-year has paid dividends and zero 
otherwise. Consistent with our third hypothesis, the findings indicate that the three-
way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all eight 
columns, implying that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker for 
dividend-paying firms. Table 9 also documents a statistically significant weaker AZL 
effect on firms’ financial constraints for dividend-paying firms. 
 
Our third-interaction variable for table 10 is a binary variable that equals one if 
a firm-year has a fixed-assets-to-assets ratio greater than average, and zero 
otherwise. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, the results reveal that the three-
way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically significant across all eight 
columns, indicating that the ZL effect on firms’ financial constraints is weaker for 
firms with greater proportions of fixed tangible assets. Interestingly, the coefficient 
on the ZL binary variable interacted with cash-flow-to-assets on columns five to eight 
lost its statistical significance when we added the third-interacted variable Tangible. 
This signifies the importance of tangibility in shaping the relationship between the 
ZL behavior and investment-to-cash-flow sensitivity. Also, table 11 suggests evidence 
consistent with our fourth hypothesis for AZL firms. Finally, the results in table 12 
and 13 show that the three-way-interacted-coefficient is negative and is statistically 
significant across all eight columns, indicating that the ZL and AZL effects on firms’ 
financial constraints is weaker for value firms.  
 
Our main results are robust to many alternative specifications, including (1) using 
subsamples that exclude the years of the global financial crisis, (2) using different 
measures of leverage, (3) using different explanatory variable combinations.  
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TABLE 1.10: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH TANGIBLE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is 
unlevered and zero otherwise. Tangible is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a fixed-assets-to-
assets ratio greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the 
ZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for tangible firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. 
Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a 
statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 6.9465*** 6.9380*** 6.8624*** 6.5707***  0.0352*** 0.0333*** 0.0329*** 0.0315*** 
ZL 0.1290*** 0.1284*** 0.1299*** 0.0842***  -0.0030*** -0.0029*** -0.0025*** -0.0081*** 
ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -1.2226*** -1.2267*** -1.2304*** -1.2757***  0.0017 0.0020 0.0020 0.0010 
Tangible 0.0337*** 0.0352*** 0.0328*** 0.0037  0.0450*** 0.0450*** 0.0450*** 0.0472*** 
Tangible × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.5178*** -0.5186*** -0.4862*** -0.6902***  0.0587*** 0.0598*** 0.0595*** 0.0548*** 
Tangible × ZL 0.1243*** 0.1206*** 0.1174*** 0.1638***  0.0057*** 0.0059*** 0.0056*** 0.0085*** 
Tangible × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.8415*** -0.8216*** -0.8020*** -0.8969***  -0.0249*** -0.0246*** -0.0242*** -0.0266*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0716*** 0.0736*** 0.0731*** 0.1019***  -0.0129*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0117*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0645*** -0.0667*** -0.0673*** -0.0905***  0.0126*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0117*** 
Age 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0013***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0200*** -0.0201*** -0.0210*** -0.0229***  -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
Sales Growth 0.4565*** 0.4564*** 0.4664*** 0.4312***  0.0119*** 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0039 0.0103***  -0.0027*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0017*** 
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.3658*** -1.4209*** -1.4615*** 1.3910***  -0.0383*** -0.0335*** -0.0339*** -0.0281*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0593*** -0.0603*** -0.0609*** -0.0680***  -0.0056*** -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0059*** 
Dividend-to-Assets -0.7915*** -0.7852*** -0.7523***   -0.0320*** -0.0308*** -0.0301***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3650*** -0.3742*** -0.3716***   -0.0351*** -0.0339*** -0.0331***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5162*** -1.5127*** -1.4899***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0505*** 0.0499***    0.0110*** 0.0109***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.5955*** -0.5994***    -0.0183*** -0.0162***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.2653***     0.0483***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0385     0.0000***    
Observations 109,652 109,655 109,655 110,531  152,945 152,953 152,953 152,954 
R-squared 0.1962 0.1962 0.1945 0.1815  0.3933 0.3926 0.3919 0.3881 
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TABLE 1.11: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH TANGIBLE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation 
has a leverage ratio below 5% and zero otherwise. Tangible is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has 
a fixed-assets-to-assets ratio greater than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient 
implies that the AZL effect on sensitivities is weaker for tangible firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a 
stronger effect. Year and sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and 
* have a statistical significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 7.0665*** 7.0601*** 6.9731*** 6.6940***  0.0351*** 0.0329*** 0.0325*** 0.0315*** 
AZL 0.0818*** 0.0808*** 0.0820*** 0.0398***  -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0027*** -0.0083*** 
AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -1.0110*** -1.0141*** -0.9963*** -1.0217***  0.0019 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 
Tangible 0.0372*** 0.0384*** 0.0354*** 0.0022  0.0445*** 0.0444*** 0.0444*** 0.0460*** 
Tangible × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.5474*** -0.5478*** -0.5046*** -0.7285***  0.0597*** 0.0607*** 0.0604*** 0.0561*** 
Tangible × AZL 0.0673*** 0.0659*** 0.0645*** 0.1001***  0.0053*** 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 0.0086*** 
Tangible × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.4918*** -0.4851*** -0.4912*** -0.5284***  -0.0184*** -0.0176*** -0.0175*** -0.0190*** 
ln (Total Assets) 0.0683*** 0.0698*** 0.0694*** 0.0949***  -0.0130*** -0.0135*** -0.0134*** -0.0121*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0621*** -0.0637*** -0.0645*** -0.0849***  0.0126*** 0.0131*** 0.0130*** 0.0120*** 
Age 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0013***  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0201*** -0.0202*** -0.0211*** -0.0232***  -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
Sales Growth 0.4562*** 0.4565*** 0.4667*** 0.4318***  0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0033 0.0108***  -0.0027*** -0.0025*** -0.0026*** -0.0017*** 
EBITDA-to-Assets -1.3731*** -1.4125*** -1.4542*** -1.3947***  -0.0383*** -0.0335*** -0.0340*** -0.0288*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0581*** -0.0588*** -0.0593*** -0.0689***  -0.0056*** -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0060*** 
Dividend-to-Assets -0.8568*** -0.8512*** -0.8182***   -0.0326*** -0.0314*** -0.0306***  
Cash-to-Assets  -0.3388*** -0.3461*** -0.3458***   -0.0343*** -0.0332*** -0.0325***  
Investment-to-Assets  -1.5221*** -1.5197*** -1.4966***       
Asset Sale-to-Assets 0.0514*** 0.0507***    0.0109*** 0.0109***   
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.6068*** -0.6099***    -0.0186*** -0.0164***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.1993***     0.0487***    
R&D-to-Sales -0.0479     0.0000***    
Observations 109,652 109,655 109,655 110,531  152,945 152,953 152,953 152,954 
R-squared 0.1961 0.1960 0.1943 0.1813  0.3933 0.3926 0.3919 0.3885 
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TABLE 1.12: ZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH VALUE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. ZL (zero leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation is 
unlevered and zero otherwise. Value is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a market-to-book ratio 
lower than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the ZL effect on 
sensitivities is weaker for value firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and sector 
fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance 
level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.4567*** 0.4505*** 0.4329*** 0.4314***  0.0153*** 0.0317*** 0.0314*** 0.0306*** 
ZL -0.0155*** -0.0122*** -0.0145*** -0.0150***  -0.0031*** -0.0124*** -0.0123*** -0.0123*** 
ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0056 -0.0089*  -0.0052** -0.0086*** -0.0084*** -0.0096*** 
Value -0.0141*** -0.0158*** -0.0133*** -0.0132***  -0.0080*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0033*** 
Value × Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.2011*** 0.1947*** 0.1961*** 0.1979***  0.0062*** 0.0269*** 0.0275*** 0.0281*** 
Value × ZL 0.0052** 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0065***  0.0069*** 0.0026** 0.0026*** 0.0025** 
Value × ZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.0625*** -0.0547*** -0.0465*** -0.0450***  -0.0166*** -0.0384*** -0.0389*** -0.0386*** 
ln (Total Assets) -0.0034*** -0.0037*** -0.0007 -0.0003  -0.0107*** -0.0101*** -0.0102*** -0.0100*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0057*** -0.0056*** -0.0088*** -0.0090***  0.0102*** 0.0099*** 0.0100*** 0.0099*** 
Age 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
Sales Growth 0.0413*** 0.0410*** 0.0405*** 0.0408***  0.0106*** 0.0104*** 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0081*** -0.0067*** -0.0085*** -0.0085***  0.0015*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0120*** -0.0134*** -0.0158*** -0.0185***  -0.0061*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0034*** 
Dividend-to-Assets -0.0804*** -0.0770*** -0.0864***   -0.0330*** -0.0353*** -0.0347***  
Asset Sale-to-Assets -0.0049*** -0.0023 -0.0033*   0.0132*** 0.0062*** 0.0059***  
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.0711*** -0.0694***    -0.0177*** -0.0233***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.2744*** -0.2707***    0.0222*** 0.0130***   
Tangibility -0.0672***     0.1925***    
R&D-to-Sales 0.0001***     0.0001***    
Observations 151,765 152,001 152,011 152,012  153,000 153,215 153,225 153,226 
R-squared 0.2965 0.2920 0.2857 0.2850  0.4511 0.3165 0.3162 0.3157 
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TABLE 1.13: AZL MULTIVARIATE-REGRESSIONS WITH VALUE AS THE THIRD BINARY VARIABLE 
 
This table displays estimates of several three-way-interacted-multivariate-regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the change in the cash-to-assets’ ratio in columns one to four, and capital-expenditure-to-assets’ ratio 
in columns five to eight. AZL (almost-zero-leverage) is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year observation 
is unlevered and zero otherwise. Value is a binary variable that equals one if a firm-year has a market-to-book 
ratio lower than average and zero otherwise. A negative three-way-interacted-coefficient implies that the AZL 
effect on sensitivities is weaker for value firms, whereas a positive coefficient suggests a stronger effect. Year and 
sector fixed effects are included in all equations. Estimates with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical 
significance level of one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Δ in Cash-to-Assets  Investment-to-Assets 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.4745*** 0.4683*** 0.4530*** 0.4515***  0.0146*** 0.0306*** 0.0303*** 0.0295*** 
AZL -0.0065*** -0.0029*** -0.0050*** -0.0053***  -0.0024*** -0.0126*** -0.0124*** -0.0124*** 
AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.0491*** -0.0496*** -0.0567*** -0.0585***  -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 
Value -0.0139*** -0.0158*** -0.0131*** -0.0130***  -0.0094*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** 
Value × Cash Flow-to-Assets 0.2013*** 0.1941*** 0.1923*** 0.1942***  0.0176*** 0.0407*** 0.0415*** 0.0422*** 
Value × AZL 0.0001 0.0013 0.0006 0.0006  0.0075*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 
Value × AZL × Cash Flow-to-Assets -0.0371*** -0.0295*** -0.0173** -0.0167*  -0.0389*** -0.0612*** -0.0620*** -0.0621*** 
ln (Total Assets) -0.0036*** -0.0035*** -0.0008* -0.0004  -0.0107*** -0.0108*** -0.0109*** -0.0108*** 
ln (Equity Capitalization) -0.0057*** -0.0058*** -0.0088*** -0.0090***  0.0101*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 0.0105*** 
Age 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
Sales Growth 0.0414*** 0.0411*** 0.0407*** 0.0409***  0.0106*** 0.0103*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
Sales-to-Assets -0.0078*** -0.0065*** -0.0082*** -0.0082***  0.0016*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** 
Dividend Binary Variable -0.0123*** -0.0138*** -0.0162*** -0.0188***  -0.0063*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0035*** 
Dividend-to-Assets -0.0795*** -0.0758*** -0.0851***   -0.0333*** -0.0363*** -0.0356***  
Asset Sale-to-Assets -0.0057*** -0.0031* -0.0041**   0.0130*** 0.0061*** 0.0058***  
Share Repurchases-to-Assets -0.0731*** -0.0709***    -0.0180*** -0.0248***   
Taxes Paid-to-Assets -0.2691*** -0.2670***    0.0215*** 0.0168***   
Tangibility -0.0678***     0.1926***    
R&D-to-Sales 0.0001***     0.0000***    
Observations 151,765 152,001 152,011 152,012  153,000 153,215 153,225 153,226 
R-squared 0.2972 0.2926 0.2865 0.2858  0.4515 0.3183 0.3180 0.3174 
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Moreover, to control for the potential survival-ship bias, we break our sample into 
several subsamples with shorter time periods. The results are consistent with our 
main empirical evidence. Furthermore, endogeneity concerns that arise from omitted 
variables are very common in empirical corporate finance studies. One possible 
remedy to the endogeneity problem is the use of a fixed effects model. A fixed-effect 
can capture any unobservable, low-frequency independent variable (e.g., 
unobservable technological differences). To address the endogeneity problem, we 
include firm- and year-specific intercepts in all our regressions and our main results 
hold. 
 
To sum up, the empirical evidence of this paper suggests that leverage is a major 
factor escalating firms' financial constraints, signifying that this escalation is more 
pronounced for firms in their early lifecycle. The results could potentially explain the 
rising zero leverage behavior of US firms over the past four decades. That is, firms 
may follow conservative debt policies to lower their financial constraints. Other 
related explanations for the rising zero leverage behavior that have been documented 
in the literature include economic cycle effects (Cantor, 1990; Bernanke et al., 1994; 
Opler and Titman, 1994; and Phillips, 1995), asset liquidation respects (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992), and ownership considerations (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013).  
 
Cantor (1990) and Opler and Titman (1994) imply that firms with high leverage 
are more susceptible to adverse economic shocks. These shocks may force them to cut 
back sharply on employment or investments. Firm with low leverage will 
correspondingly pick up their slack. Consistent with these studies, Bernanke et al. 
(1994) develop the autoregressive financial accelerator theory in which adverse 
exogenous shocks lower current cash flows and raises investment costs. This reduces 
investment spending and cash flows in later periods, proliferating the initial adverse 
shock. The financial accelerator effects are stronger, the deeper the economic 
downturn and the higher the leverage ratio. In this view, Phillips (1995) posits a 
model in which rivals with superior access to capital might increase output and 
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sustain losses to drive highly leveraged firms into insolvency. Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) suggest that the best response to predation is to lower firms’ financial 
constraints. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explain that when a financially distressed firm try to 
sell its corporate assets during downturns, other potential buyers in the industry are 
expected to experience similar problems. Even if not, industry regulations may 
prevent them from buying distressed corporate assets. This magnifies the costs of 
financial distress which are associated with leverage. Moreover, declines in asset 
liquidity and debt capacity will reinforce each other since asset liquidity relies on debt 
capacity, and debt capacity depends on liquidity. As a result, highly-leveraged firms 
will probably survive only when corporate assets remain liquid. Lastly, Strebulaev 
and Yang (2013) suggest that family-owned and manager-owned firms are likely to 
have lower levels of leverage. This is because the owners if these firms are expected 
to be under-diversified and have a desire for long-term survival. 
 
6. Conclusion: 
This paper started by highlighting some of the theories explaining why firms may 
be financially constrained and discussing some of the empirical studies documenting 
that certain firm characteristics could potentially mitigate the severity of a firm’s 
financial constraints. Several testable hypotheses are then suggested. Namely, the 
study proposes that unleveraged firms are expected to face lower financial constraints 
relative to leveraged firms and that the zero-leverage effect on firms’ financial 
constraints is more likely to be stronger for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms 
with lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms. 
 
Indeed, the findings of this study support the hypotheses proposed. Using a large 
dataset of yearly firm observations that spans from 1965 to 2017, the empirical 
results also show an astonishing remarkable growing ZL behavior of publicly-traded 
US firms over the past four decades. The results are consistent with the debt 
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overhang theory which explains how leverage may have negative effects on a firm’s 
value by increasing its financial constraints and weakening its ability to undertake 
profitable future investments. Finally, the findings are also consistent with the large 
body of literature suggesting that small firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with low 
tangibility, and growth firms face greater financial distress and bankruptcy 
likelihoods. Hence, these firm’s financial constraint levels are more susceptible to 
their leverage levels compared to larger firms, dividend-paying firms, firms with high 
tangibility, and value firms, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A New Model for Screening Shariah Compliant Firms 
 
1. Introduction:  
When investing in the equity capital markets, countries and investors who choose 
to adhere to the Shariah law often apply a set of qualitative and quantitative screens 
to exclude equity firms that are Shariah-incompliant. Qualitative screens are sector 
screens through which firms primarily operating within specific Shariah-
impermissible industries (e.g., tobacco products and alcoholic beverages) are 
excluded. Implementing sector screens is relatively straightforward and only exclude 
a small portion of equity firms. Firms that satisfy the qualitative screens are subject 
to quantitative financial screens through which only firms that are involved in a 
negligible impermissible activity (e.g., minor interest payments or occasional sale of 
liquor) are deemed as Shariah-compliant. Those with impermissible activities 
exceeding a subjectively-specified threshold are considered Shariah-incompliant. 
Unlike sector screens, financial screens are vague and apply to roughly all equity 
firms because almost all firms are involved in interest payments. 
 
Although there exists an overwhelming consensus among Shariah experts that 
interest is a grave and sinful act in Islam, a large number of contemporary Shariah 
experts argue that minor impermissible acts do not render the whole firm as 
impermissible. The rationale behind this view is that it is almost impossible to find a 
firm that is fully Shariah-compliant in today’s equity capital markets. Even if there 
are a few, they are not sufficient to absorb all the wealth of Shariah-compliant 
investors and they will probably be concentrated in small regions of the world putting 
the wealth of Shariah-compliant investors at a very high risk (DeLorenzo, 2000). In 
addition to that, Shariah-compliant equity investors are in most cases minority 
investors with limited control and voting power. If a shareholder objects an 
impermissible contract, but his objection was overruled by a majority vote, one cannot 
conclude that the contract was approved by that shareholder (Derigs and Marzban, 
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2008). Hence, investing in some Shariah-incompliant firms became permissible due 
to the absence of the ideal alternative and because there is a need that must be 
satisfied with the lowest harm and highest benefit. Investors are required, however, 
to express their disapproval against impermissible dealings and to purify their 
earnings from any impermissible income. 
 
Based on the above view, a number of Shariah-compliant equity funds and index 
providers have emerged11. Most of them follow similar criteria in implementing sector 
screens. Remarkable discrepancies, however, exist between the different financial 
screens. This is mainly because specifying the threshold of non-negligible 
impermissible acts is purely subjective. For example, regarding the ratio of interest-
bearing debt to total assets, a wide threshold dispersion ranging from 25 to 50 percent 
exist among the different financial screening guidelines. Beside the remarkable 
discrepancies, using thresholds to classify firms as “Shariah-compliant” or “Islamic” 
is problematic. Take the threshold of 33 percent for the debt-to-assets ratio as an 
example. This threshold implies that firms with a debt ratio of 34 percent are 
Shariah-incompliant, whereas firms with a debt ratio of 32 percent are indeed 
Shariah-compliant. It also implies that firms with a 15 percent debt ratio are as 
compliant as firms with a 5 percent debt ratio. The reality is that none of the 
referenced firms are fully compliant, but some are more compliant (i.e., less Shariah-
sinful) than others.  
 
The wide variations in the current Shariah-compliant equity screening practices 
have resulted in conflicted and inconsistent classifications, leaving the Shariah-
compliant investors confused and discouraged. Moreover, with today's modern 
technology and big data analytics, one can easily build up models for Shariah-
compliant investors that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the harms of 
                                                 
11 These include for example the Dow Jones Islamic Index, Financial Times Islamic Index, Standard 
& Poor’s Islamic Index, Morgan Stanley Capital International Islamic Index, Dubai Islamic Bank 
Fund, and HSBC Amanah Fund. 
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investing and participating in the world’s equity capital markets. Thus, the 
development of an integrated screening framework that is customizable and 
understandable will surely enrich the reliability and practicality of the Shariah-
compliant equity investments. 
 
This paper posits the Weighted Average Shariah-Compliance Percentile 
(hereafter: WASC). This measure reflects the extent to which a firm adheres to 
Shariah relative to the other firms located in a certain region at a certain time. The 
WASC is a financial quantitative measure that ranges from zero to one and only 
applies to firms that satisfy the sector screens. Firms whose core business is 
impermissible are initially excluded and are deemed as Shariah-incompliant. Each 
firm that satisfies the sector screens is then given various percentile ranks. These 
ranks are then used to calculate the WASC. A firm with a 90% US WASC in 2015 is 
more Shariah-compliant than 90% of all US firms in 2015. This simple number 
provides the Shariah-compliant investor with a clear precise understanding of the 
relative compliance status of each firm he wishes to invest in. Hence, it is more 
Shariah-appropriate than the use of thresholds. Also, this single numeric figure can 
be easily incorporated into portfolio optimization models.  
 
Section three provides a detailed overview and analysis of all the optional formats 
used to customize the WASC. The WASC can be customized by specifying the set of 
financial ratios, the dataset, and the weight for each of its various accounts. Current 
screening practitioners do not all use the same set of financial ratios when carrying 
out the quantitative screens. For example, there is a debate among Shariah experts 
as to whether use market or accounting book values to value the worth of a firm, 
where this value is used as a divisor for various financial ratios (Nisar and 
Khatkhatay, 2006). Specification of the dataset is also necessary because the WASC 
is a relative percentile measure. Since some equity funds may be limited to investing 
their asset base across certain regions, each equity fund may have distinctive 
datasets. Although the availability of multiple formats impairs the consistency of 
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equity screens, it accommodates all the existing views of Shariah experts. It can also 
be designed to be consistent with each portfolio’s objectives and constraints, making 
the WASC suitable and applicable to a wide number of Shariah-compliant equity 
investors. There cannot be a unified format of the WASC simply because investors 
will always have different objectives, constraints, and views about the appropriate 
set of financial ratios and weights. Hence, it is expected that each screening 
practitioner may have distinctive sets of weights, financial ratios, datasets, and 
WASC values. 
 
Finally, the paper presents illustrative results using a sample of all publicly 
traded US firms from the year 2010 to 2016. The results are discussed and compared 
across different firms, years, sets of weights, and sets of financial ratios. The results 
indicate that firms with considerable amounts of monetary assets and liabilities will 
show varying WASC values depending on whether book or market values are used as 
ratio divisors. Moreover, the use of different sets of WASC weights may have 
significant effects on the WASC if there are large discrepancies between the various 
percentile accounts used to calculate the WASC. Lastly, the results suggest a 
negative relationship between each account ratio and its percentile that varies from 
account to another due to the changing aggregate firm behavior over time. 
 
Section 2 briefly highlights the current Shariah-compliant equity screening 
practices. Section 3 analyzes all the formats used to customize the WASC. Section 4 
presents a general case of the WASC.  Section 5 reports the results, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Current Equity Screening Practices:  
All Shariah-compliant equity investors start their screens by excluding firms that 
primarily operate within specific impermissible industries (e.g., tobacco products and 
alcoholic beverages). There are three main industry classification codes used to carry  
  
 
 47 
 
  
TABLE 2.1: SHARIAH INCOMPLIANT INDUSTRY CODES 
 
This table reports the different codes for industries that are deemed as Shariah incompliant by most Shariah compliant 
screening practitioners. x denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 9. xx denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 99. xxxx 
denotes all discrete numbers from 0 to 9999.  SIC (Standard Industry Classification) is developed in 1937 by the US 
government. GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) is developed in 1999 by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI. For 
more information, see the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices Methodology (2018), MSCI Islamic Index Series Methodology 
(2015), S&P Shariah Indices Methodology (2018), and FTSE Shariah Global Equity Index Series (2018). 
 
Panel A: SIC codes: 
 
SIC Code Incompliant Industries SIC Code Incompliant Industries 
0132 Tobacco Farming 60xx Depository Institutions 
0213 Hog and Pig Farming 61xx Nondepository Credit Institutions 
2013 Sausage Products 62xx Security & Commodity Brokers 
2082 Breweries 63xx Insurance Carriers 
2084 Wineries 64xx Insurance Agents Brokers & Service 
2085 Distilleries 6797 Mortgage Institutions 
21xx Tobacco Products Manufacturers 6798 Mortgage Institutions 
5181 Beer and Ale Merchant Wholesalers 7011 Casino Hotels 
5182 Alcoholic Beverage Merchant Wholesalers 78xx Motion Pictures 
5194 Tobacco Merchant Wholesalers 791x Dance Studios 
5735 Musical Instrument and Supplies Stores 792x Theatrical Producers 
5736 Musical Instrument and Supplies Stores 866x Religious Organizations 
5813 Alcoholic Beverages 93xx Public Finance 
5921 Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 9711 Weapon Related Establishments 
5993 Tobacco Stores   
Panel B: GICS codes: 
 
GICS Code Incompliant Industries GICS Code Incompliant Industries 
20101010 Aerospace & Defense 30201010 Brewers 
25301010 Casinos & Gaming 30201020 Distillers & Vintners 
25301020 Hotels, Resorts & Cruise Lines 30203010 Tobacco 
25301040 Restaurants 4010xxxx Banks 
25401020 Broadcasting 4020xxxx Diversified Financials 
25401025 Cable & Satellite 4030xxxx Insurance 
25401030 Movies & Entertainment   
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out the sector screens: GICS, ICB, and SIC12. The benefit of using the SIC is that a 
firm may have multiple SIC codes based on its different business activities, whereas 
only one GICS and ICB code is assigned to each firm based on its core-business 
activity (Derigs and Marzban, 2008). Table 1 shows the different SIC codes for 
industries that are deemed as Shariah incompliant. Firms that satisfy the sector 
screens are subject to quantitative financial screens. In these screens, firms that are 
involved in impermissible financial contracts exceeding a subjectively-specified 
threshold are considered Shariah-incompliant. 
 
Most Shariah-compliant equity investors apply four sets of quantitative financial 
screens: interest, debt, liquidity, and impermissible income screens13. Interest and 
debt screens merely focus on investigating the level of interest-bearing investments 
and finances, respectively. Since Shariah experts concur that interest is 
impermissible, lower threshold discrepancies are found in the different contemporary 
debt and interest screens relative to the monetary and impermissible income screens. 
 
 Impermissible income screens focus on investigating the level of earnings 
generated from Shariah-incompliant activities. It can be applied, for instance, to an 
airline company to measure the amount of income generated from alcohol sales. Such 
screens are less-frequently used by screening practitioners. This is probably because 
sector screens are already conducted and because current accounting standards do 
not require firms to disclose all income source elements. If the impermissible revenue 
is significant, it will most likely be reflected in the sector classifications (e.g., SIC 
codes). One can always conduct a thorough investigation of each firm’s revenue 
                                                 
12 SIC (Standard Industry Classification) is developed in 1937 by the US government. GICS (Global 
Industry Classification Standard) is developed in 1999 by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI. ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark) is developed in 2005 by Dow Jones and FTSE. 
13 See the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices Methodology (2018), MSCI Islamic Index Series 
Methodology (2015), S&P Shariah Indices Methodology (2018), and FTSE Shariah Global Equity Index 
Series (2018). More information about these is available in the references. Also, see Derigs and 
Marzban (2008) for a comprehensive review of the Shariah-compliant equity screening practices. 
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sources, but such an investigation is costly and impractical, especially because the 
reliability of the results is as good as the disclosures. 
 
Liquidity or monetary screens focus on investigating the level of monetary 
assets14. Because not all Shariah experts have same views regarding the 
permissibility of monetary assets, a larger threshold dispersion is found among the 
different contemporary monetary screens. To understand why Shariah favors non-
monetary assets (e.g., inventory and PP&E) over monetary assets (e.g., cash and cash 
equivalents, short- and long-term debt investments, and accounts relievable), 
consider these two rather extreme examples. If a firm holds cash as its only asset, 
then the total value of the firm's outstanding shares must equal the total value of 
cash held. This is because, according to Shariah, when money is traded with money, 
the trade must be exactly equal15. Similarly, if a firm holds accounts receivables and 
marketable securities as its only assets, then purchasing shares from that firm is 
viewed as purchasing debt. Shariah clearly prohibits the purchase or sale of any debt, 
whether it involves interest or not. Shariah experts all agree upon the restrictions 
involved in purchasing solo monetary assets, but they have different views in 
attributing the stock price to the monetary assets. The least restrictive view suggests 
that as long as (1) a firm holds non-monetary assets and (2) the total value of the 
firm's outstanding shares is in excess of total monetary assets, the firm is deemed as 
Shariah-compliant, because the excess value can be attributed to the non-monetary 
assets (Nisar and Khatkhatay, 2006). 
 
Similar arguments that apply to monetary assets also apply to monetary 
liabilities. Specifically, all Shariah experts agree upon the restrictions involved in  
                                                 
14 Monetary assets are assets that involve the right to receive a determinable amount of currency units. 
By the same token, monetary liabilities are liabilities that involve the obligation to deliver a 
determinable amount of currency units. Most Shariah-compliant equity investors use the term ‘liquid’ 
assets as opposed to ‘monetary’ assets. The accounting term ‘liquid’ is inappropriate in this context 
because it includes inventory and excludes long-term interest-bearing investments. The more 
appropriate and relevant accounting terminology is using the term ‘monetary’. 
15 According to Shariah, the trade also must be instant. 
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TABLE 2.2: DEBT, INTEREST, IMPERMISSIBLE INCOME, AND MONETARY RATIOS 
 
This table presents the main debt, interest, impermissible income, and monetary ratios used by the major Shariah-compliant 
equity funds and Islamic index providers. Market capitalization is the total market value of a firm's outstanding common 
shares at a certain time. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents.  
 
 Debt Ratios Interest Ratios 
Impermissible 
Income Ratios 
Monetary Ratios 
First Ratio 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ +  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Second 
Ratio 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ +  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 - 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Third Ratio 
 
- 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 - 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Fourth 
Ratio 
- 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 - 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Sixth Ratio - 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
- 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Seventh 
Ratio 
- 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 - 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Eighth 
Ratio 
- 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 - - 
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selling any solo debt obligations, but they have different views in carrying the debt 
obligations on the common stockholders. The least restrictive view suggests that due 
to the limited liability feature of publicly traded companies, the sale of a firm common 
stock is independent of the firm’s debt obligations (Nisar and Khatkhatay, 2006). 
 
3. Specifying the Ratios, the Dataset, and the Weights: 
3.1. Specifying the Ratios: 
Table 2 presents the main debt, interest, impermissible income, and monetary 
ratios used by the major Shariah-compliant equity funds and Islamic index providers. 
 
3.1.1. Book and Market Firm Value: 
One major cause of the ratio variations presented in table 2 is the disagreement 
over the variable representing the worth of a firm, where this variable is used as a 
divisor for the various financial ratios. Some funds and indexes use market 
capitalization16 as a ratio divisor. But market capitalization may lead to undesirable 
performances for the Shariah-compliant investor when stocks are mispriced17. 
Specifically, overpriced stocks will falsely appear more Shariah-compliant whereas 
underpriced stocks will inaccurately appear less Shariah-compliant, leaving 
investors who try to optimize their degree of Shariah-compliance misled and 
disadvantaged18. 
 
Also, there is a large body of the corporate finance literature suggesting that the 
amount of corporate leverage collateralized by existing assets will be more than is 
collateralized by future growth, holding other things equal. Myers (1977) explains 
why managers often set firms’ target leverage ratios relative to book as opposed to 
                                                 
16 Or average monthly market capitalization to smooth the measure and eliminate any seasonality 
effects. 
17 While there is an ongoing debate over asset price drivers, both behavioral- and rational-based asset 
pricing theories tend to agree on the view that there may be temporary price deviations from the 
fundamental or efficient price. 
18 The empirical results in section five provide more discussion as to why the use of market value as 
a ratio divisor may disadvantage Shariah-compliant investors. 
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market values. He states: “it is not that book values are more accurate than stock 
market values, but simply that they refer to assets already in place. A significant part 
of many firms’ market values is accounted for by assets not yet in place (i.e., by the 
present value of future growth opportunities).” Myers’ (1977) debt overhang theory 
explains how corporate leverage can reduce firms’ value by weakening their incentive 
to undertake good future investments. Consistent with the debt overhang theory, a 
number of empirical studies document that leverage is negatively associated with 
firms’ market value and with future growth (e.g., Cai and Zhang (2011), Ahn et al. 
(2006), Aivazian and Qiu (2005), Lang et al. (1996), McConnell and Servaes (1995)). 
These studies imply that leverage should not be measured relative to market values 
because growth decreases with leverage and is not yet realized. 
 
In summary, the use of market capitalization is advantageous in that it is 
independent of accounting standards discrepancies and reflects the market value of 
the firm, but the use of market capitalization can be: (1) inappropriate because it 
majorly accounts for future growth opportunities that are not yet realized, (2) 
disadvantageous when stocks are mispriced, (3) unstable when prices are volatile, 
and (4) irrelevant when prices are driven by external market factors. To reduce the 
effect of price volatility, some investors use average monthly market capitalization to 
smooth the measure.  
 
The worth of a firm can alternatively be accounted for using total book asset value. 
Indeed, book values tend to be stable and reflect assets already in place, but book 
values are more susceptible to accounting standards discrepancies and reporting 
biases. To reduce the effects of accounting standards discrepancies, time must be 
spent in correcting for the accounting practice differences between the countries. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyze the different accounting practices of multiple 
countries and point to the modifications required so that leverage measures can be 
internationally comparable. Alternatively, one can simply use distinctive datasets for 
each country to avoid the effects of accounting standards discrepancies. 
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3.1.2. Monetary Assets and Liabilities: 
Another main cause of ratio dissimilarity presented in table 2 is the specification 
of monetary and interest-bearing assets used to calculate monetary and interest 
ratios, respectively. Clearly, there is a noticeable overlap in the monetary and 
interest ratios. This is because all interest-bearing assets are also monetary assets 19. 
It is also important to note that some monetary assets are more Shariah-incompliant 
than others. For example, monetary assets that earn greater interest (e.g., bonds) are 
more Shariah-incompliant than monetary assets that earn less interest (e.g., 
certificates of deposit) or zero interest (e.g., some accounts receivables). In general, 
long-term interest-based investments and liabilities are more likely to be more 
Shariah-incompliant than short-term interest-based investments and liabilities. This 
is because long-term interest-based investments and liabilities imply the intent of 
holding these incompliant deals for longer time periods. Also, interest-yields often 
increase with maturity because investors often demand higher interest rates for 
longer-term riskier investments. 
 
To account for this matter, interest and monetary screens can be combined and 
represented by one measure. This measure can be calculated as a weighted average 
of several monetary asset accounts with greater weights assigned to the more 
Shariah-incompliant monetary asset accounts20. The general formula for the 
weighted average monetary assets percentile at time t for firm i can be represented 
as: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡              (1) 
 
                                                 
19 But not all monetary assets (e.g., some accounts receivable) are interest-bearing assets. 
20 All sorts of short- and long-term equity investments (e.g., equity stocks, investments in associates) 
are non-monetary assets. 
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Where Interest Bearing Investments denote the monetary investments percentile. It 
reflects the relative rate to which a firm coincide with Shariah in that lower 
proportions of its total assets are interest-bearing investments. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ denotes the cash 
and cash equivalents percentile and reflects the relative degree to which a firm 
complies with Shariah in that lower proportions of its total assets are recorded as 
cash and cash equivalents. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 denotes the receivables percentile and reflects 
the relative extent to which a firm is more Shariah-compliant in that lower 
proportions of its total assets are documented as receivables. 𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼 , 𝑊𝐶 , and 𝑊𝑅 denote 
the weights of the monetary investments percentile, cash and cash equivalents 
percentile, and receivables percentile, respectively.  
 
Panel A in table three presents the different monetary asset ratios used to 
calculate the monetary investments percentile, cash and cash equivalents percentile, 
and receivables percentile. Long-term interest-bearing investments can include 
investments in bonds and long-term note receivable. Short-term interest-bearing 
investments can include investments in certificates of deposit, commercial papers, 
and short-term notes. 
 
Debt screens can also be decomposed and calculated as a weighted average of 
several monetary liability accounts with greater weights assigned to the more 
Shariah-incompliant monetary liability accounts. The general formula for the 
weighted average monetary liabilities percentile at time t for firm i can be 
represented as: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑊𝐿𝐷𝐿𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
 
Where 𝐿𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 and 𝑆𝑇 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 denote the long- and short-term debt percentile. They 
reflect the relative level to which a firm is more Shariah-consistent in that lower 
proportions of its total liability and equity are classified as long- and short-term debt. 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 denotes the payables percentile and reflects the relative scale to which a  
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TABLE 2.3: MONETARY ASSET AND LIABILITY RATIOS 
 
Panel A presents the different monetary asset ratios used to calculate the long- and short-term interest-bearing investments 
percentiles, cash and cash equivalents percentile, and receivables percentile. Panel B presents the different monetary liability 
ratios used to calculate the long-term debt, short-term debt, and payables percentiles. Panel C presents the different financial 
margins used to calculate the interest income, interest expense, and impermissible income percentiles. Market capitalization 
is the total market value of a firm's outstanding common shares at a certain time. Average market capitalization is the average 
monthly market capitalization over a certain time period. Total interest-bearing investments can include investments in 
bonds, certificates of deposit, commercial papers, and notes. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents. Receivables can include 
trade receivables and other current receivables. Total long-term debt can include corporate bonds, capitalized lease obligations, 
non-convertible debt, and other long-term debt. Total short-term debt can include current portion of long-term debt, 
commercial papers, convertible debt and other short-term debt. Payables can include accounts payable and income taxes 
payable.  
 
Panel A: Monetary Asset Ratios: 
 
 Interest-bearing Investment 
Ratios 
Cash Ratios Receivables Ratios 
Using Total Assets 
LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Using Market 
Capitalization 
LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Using Average Market 
Capitalization 
LT and ST Interest bearing Inves.
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
 
 
Panel B:  Monetary Liability Ratios: 
 
 Long Term Debt Ratios Short Term Debt Ratios Payables Ratios 
Using Total Assets 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Using Market 
Capitalization 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Using Average Market 
Capitalization 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙.
 
 
 
Panel C: Income Statement Margins: 
 
 Interest Income Margin Interest Expense Margin Impermissible Income Margin 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
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firm adheres to Shariah in that lower proportions of its total liability and equity are 
recorded as payables. 𝑊𝐿𝐷 , 𝑊𝑆𝐷 , and 𝑊𝑃 denote the weights of the long-term debt 
percentile, short-term debt percentile, and payables percentile, respectively. 
 
Panel B in table three presents the different monetary liability ratios used to 
calculate the long-term debt, short-term debt, and payables percentiles. Long-term 
debt can include corporate bonds, capitalized lease obligations, non-convertible debt, 
and other long-term debt. Short-term debt can include current portion of long-term 
debt, commercial papers, convertible debt, and other short-term debt. Payables can 
include accounts payable and income taxes payable.  
 
In addition to monetary assets and liabilities screens, other secondary screens 
may include interest revenue and expense screens and impermissible income screens. 
Unlike monetary asset and liability screens, interest screens focus on gauging and 
verifying interest revenue and expense levels using a firm’s income statement, as 
opposed to using a firm’s balance sheet. Impermissible income screens can also be 
used to verify the level of engagements in impermissible acts, other than interest, 
that are not captured by the sector screens. Panel C in table three presents the 
different financial margins used to calculate the interest income, interest expense, 
and impermissible income percentiles. 
 
One major limitation of using these secondary screens is that firms tend to not 
report their insignificant revenue and expense constituents in their financial 
statements. Hence, these screens may require a thorough investigation of all the 
sources of each firm’s revenues and expenses. But such investigations may not be 
robust and practical, especially because current accounting standards do not require 
detailed disclosers of all the revenue and expense elements.  
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3.2. Specifying the Dataset: 
Since the WASC is a relative measure, the dataset must be distinctively specified. 
The dataset can be all publicly traded companies in one country, multiple countries, 
one continent, multiple continents, or the entire globe. Due to economic or political 
reasons, some Shariah-compliant equity funds may be restricted from investing their 
asset base in certain countries or sectors. Also, for diversification purposes, some 
equity funds may initially allocate certain proportions of their asset base across 
different countries or sectors. Hence, each screening practitioner may have 
distinctive datasets that are consistent with his objectives and constraints or may 
have multiple datasets, one for each country or sector21.  
 
3.3. Specifying the Weights: 
The general rule is that greater weights should be assigned to the accounts that 
are (1) more agreed-upon by Shariah experts, (2) more Shariah-incompliant, and (3) 
more reliably measured. 
 
4. The Model:  
Using equations (1) and (2), the general formula for the WASC at time t for firm i 
can be represented as: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑀𝐿 × (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑊𝑀𝐴 × (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸𝑖,𝑡     (3) 
 
0r: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =   𝑊𝑀𝐿 × (𝑊𝐿𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑆𝐷𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑊𝑀𝐴 ×
(𝑊𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸𝑖,𝑡     (4)  
 
Where I𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅/𝐸 denotes the interest revenue and expense percentile and 
reflects the relative rate to which a firm comply with Shariah in that it has lower 
                                                 
21 Having multiple datasets can be useful to avoid the effects of accounting standards discrepancies. 
 
 58 
interest revenue and expense margins in its income statement. 𝑊𝑀𝐿, 𝑊𝑀𝐴, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑊𝐼𝑅𝐸 
denote the weights of the weighted average monetary assets percentile, the weighted 
average monetary liabilities percentile, and the interest revenue and expense 
percentile, respectively. 
 
To calculate a percentile, its relevant financial ratios are calculated for all firms 
in a specific region at a specific year. For each ratio (e.g., long-term debt to assets 
ratio), firms with a ratio of zero are initially excluded and are immediately given a 
percentile of 100%. Firms with a ratio higher than zero are counted and ranked 
numerically from bottom to top based on their ratio value. Following the Allen Hazen 
(1869–1930) mothed, the percentile of ratio r22 at time t for firm i can be represented 
as: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 =   
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 − 0.5
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑟,𝑡
                (5) 
 
5. Illustrative Results: 
To illustrate the use of the WASC, we use merged annual Compustat and CRSP 
datasets for all publicly traded firms in the United States over the period from 2010 
to 2016. The SIC codes presented in table one are used to exclude all firms primarily 
operating within Shariah-impermissible industries. This resulted in excluding about 
22% of our sample database. On the date each firm reports its annual financial 
statements, market capitalization is calculated as share price times total shares 
outstanding. Average market capitalization is the average monthly market 
capitalization over the twelve months prior to each firm’s annual reporting date. All 
the ratios in table three are then calculated using total book assets, market 
capitalization, and average monthly market capitalization as ratio divisors. To get an 
idea of how using different ratio divisors can affect our main financial ratios, we  
  
                                                 
22 Ratio r can be any of the ratios presented in table 3 (e.g., long-term debt to assets ratio).  
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TABLE 2.4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This table reports several descriptive statistics for a sample of 19,960 yearly observations from 2010 to 2016. For 
each ratio, the observations’ number, mean, median, standard deviation are reported.  The last column reports 
the difference in ratio means. The numbers in parentheses are p-values associated with the parametric two-sample 
t-test. 
 
 
Panel A: Total Assets and Market Capitalization as Ratio Divisors: 
 
 Total Assets as a Ratio Divisor  Market Capitalization as a Ratio Divisor  Significance tests 
Ratio Obs. Mean SD Median  Obs. Mean SD Median  
Difference in 
means 
Interest Bearing Inv. 19756 0.0740 0.1552 0.0032   19756 0.0559 0.1200 0.0031  
0.0181 
(0.0000) 
Cash 19685 0.1676 0.1951 0.1025  19685 0.1375 0.1557 0.0865  
0.0301 
(0.0000) 
Receivables 19300 0.1207 0.1092 0.0996  19300 0.1421 0.1713 0.0825  
-0.0214 
(0.0000) 
Monetary Asset 18353 0.3647 0.2580 0.3012  18353 0.2967 0.2172 0.2387  
0.0680 
(0.0000) 
LT Debt 18086 0.1555 0.1743 0.1056  18086 0.1800 0.2345 0.0775  
-0.0245 
(0.0000) 
ST Debt 19489 0.0431 0.0923 0.0063  19489 0.0580 0.1312 0.0057  
-0.0149 
(0.0000) 
Payables 19640 0.0718 0.0733 0.0502  19640 0.0955 0.1391 0.0458  
-0.0238 
(0.0000) 
Monetary Liability 16696 0.2517 0.1978 0.2264  16696 0.2562 0.2555 0.1701  
-0.0045 
(0.0016) 
Panel B:  Market Capitalization and Average Market Capitalization as Ratio Divisors: 
 
 Average Market Cap. as a Ratio Divisor  Market Capitalization as a Ratio Divisor  Significance tests 
Ratio Obs. Mean SD Median  Obs. Mean SD Median  
Difference in 
means 
Interest Bearing Inv. 15970 0.0518 0.1070 0.0033   15970 0.0556 0.1180 0.0033  
-0.0038 
(0.0000) 
Cash 15873 0.1255 0.1379 0.0812  15873 0.1348 0.1543 0.0842  
-0.0093 
(0.0000) 
Receivables 15528 0.1362 0.1579 0.0837  15528 0.1421 0.1673 0.0847  
-0.0059 
(0.0000) 
Monetary Asset 14656 0.2805 0.2006 0.2298  14656 0.2908 0.2115 0.2348  
-0.0103 
(0.0000) 
LT Debt 14506 0.1772 0.2234 0.0860  14506 0.1804 0.2279 0.0877  
-0.0032 
(0.0000) 
ST Debt 15749 0.0536 0.1171 0.0062  15749 0.0582 0.1293 0.0062  
-0.0046 
(0.0000) 
Payables 15832 0.0888 0.1224 0.0454  15832 0.0955 0.1363 0.0470  
-0.0067 
(0.0000) 
Monetary Liability 13355 0.2510 0.2428 0.1740  13355 0.2555 0.2464 0.1778  
-0.0045 
(0.0000) 
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TABLE 2.5: YEARLY AVERAGE RATIO FREQUENCIES 
 
This table displays the yearly average ratio frequencies from 2010 to 2016. The ratios without parentheses are 
calculated using total assets as a ratio divisor. The ratios in parentheses are calculated using market 
capitalization as a ratio divisor. Column Observ. reports the number of firms in a given year in the sample. 
 
Year 
Interest 
Inv. 
Cash Receivab. 
Monetary 
Asset 
LT Debt ST Debt Payables 
Monetary 
Liability 
Observ. 
2010 
0.0747 0.1675 0.1316 0.3763 0.1299 0.0450 0.0762 0.2380 
2921 
(0.0606) (0.1429) (0.1552) (0.3218) (0.1633) (0.0640) (0.1001) (0.2509) 
2011 
0.0682 0.1627 0.1266 0.3589 0.1356 0.0410 0.0740 0.2382 
2833 
(0.0653) (0.1609) (0.1694) (0.3353) (0.1793) (0.0645) (0.1141) (0.2651) 
2012 
0.0681 0.1582 0.1251 0.3533 0.1479 0.0426 0.0735 0.2508 
2768 
(0.0588) (0.1473) (0.1612) (0.3127) (0.1831) (0.0654) (0.1053) (0.2675) 
2013 
0.0703 0.1749 0.1234 0.3703 0.1623 0.0428 0.0719 0.2655 
2813 
(0.0471) (0.1248) (0.1276) (0.2729) (0.1698) (0.0491) (0.0831) (0.2435) 
2014 
0.0770 0.1746 0.1177 0.3723 0.1745 0.0437 0.0708 0.2796 
2947 
(0.0494) (0.1218) (0.1261) (0.2714) (0.1805) (0.0491) (0.0854) (0.2537) 
2015 
0.0797 0.1695 0.1099 0.3634 0.1820 0.0495 0.0689 0.2906 
2923 
(0.0562) (0.1357) (0.1337) (0.2872) (0.1934) (0.0591) (0.0940) (0.2617) 
2016 
0.0804 0.1679 0.1103 0.3617 0.2010 0.0553 0.0715 0.3130 
2551 
(0.0540) (0.1289) (0.1213) (0.2764) (0.2022) (0.0602) (0.0868) (0.2743) 
Average 
0.0740 0.1680 0.1207 0.3654 0.1613 0.0456 0.0724 0.2674 
- 
(0.0559) (0.1375) (0.1421) (0.2966) (0.1812) (0.0587) (0.0956) (0.2591) 
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report in table 4 several ratio descriptive statistics. For each ratio, the total number 
of observations, mean, standard deviation, and median are reported. Panel A 
compares between the ratios when calculated using total assets as a ratio divisor and 
when calculated using market capitalization as a ratio divisor. Panel B compares 
between the ratios when calculated using average monthly market capitalization as 
a ratio divisor and when calculated using market capitalization as a ratio divisor. The 
last column displays a statistically and economically significant difference in means 
for ratios in panel A, but minor economic significance for ratios in panel B. Table 5 
displays the yearly average ratio frequencies from 2010 to 2016. Of all the other 
ratios, the average long-term debt ratio was remarkably and continually trending up 
over time. The other ratios stayed relatively stable over the sample period. 
 
Before calculating the percentiles, we break our database into seven parts, one 
part for each year. It is important to separate each observation year from another 
since the WASC is a relative cross-sectional percentile measure. Firms with a ratio 
of zero are initially excluded and are immediately given a percentile of 100%. For 
each ratio, firms with a positive ratio are counted and ranked numerically from 
bottom to top based on their ratio value. As per equation 5, percentiles are then 
calculated. As per equation 4, the WASC is then calculated for each firm using three 
different sets of financial ratio divisors and three different sets of weights. Table 6 
displays the average ratio and percentile frequencies across ten sectors classified 
according to SIC major group classifications. The last column reports the number of 
firms in a given sector in the sample after excluding firms primarily operating within 
Shariah-impermissible industries. A high portion of our sample firms is operating in 
the manufacturing sector, whereas only 144 yearly firm observations are classified in 
the agricultural sector. One important observation that can be drawn from table 6 is 
that the average WASC across all the sectors is not widely dispersed. This is mainly 
because the ratios tend to offset each other (e.g., the effect of a relatively low interest-
bearing investment ratio in the mining sector is offset by the effect of a relatively high 
long-term debt ratio). 
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TABLE 2.6: SECTOR AVERAGE RATIO AND PERCENTILE FREQUENCIES 
 
This table displays the average ratio and percentile frequencies across different sectors from 2010 to 2016.  The numbers 
without parentheses are average ratios frequencies, whereas the numbers in parentheses are average percentile 
frequencies. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in table 10. Column Observ. reports the 
number of firms in a given sector in the sample. Total assets book value is used as the ratio divisor. The ten sectors are 
classified according to SIC major group classifications. 
 
Sector 
SIC 
Code 
Interest 
Inv. 
Cash Receivab. 
Monetary 
Asset 
LT Debt ST Debt Payables 
Monetary 
Liability 
WASC Observ. 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
Fishing 
0100 to 
0999 
0.0477 0.1032 0.0940 0.2449 0.1606 0.0333 0.0601 0.2540 
0.7030 144 
(0.7459) (0.6670) (0.6237) (0.7319) (0.6831) (0.6744) (0.6784) (0.6794) 
Mining 
1000 to 
1499 
0.0269 0.1052 0.0597 0.1918 0.2203 0.0615 0.0691 0.3509 
0.7301 2244 
(0.8460) (0.6595) (0.7202) (0.8211) (0.6010) (0.7379) (0.5964) (0.6555) 
Construction 
1500 to 
1799 
0.0347 0.1174 0.1860 0.3381 0.2243 0.0538 0.1001 0.3782 
0.6462 436 
(0.7389) (0.5391) (0.4586) (0.7049) (0.5776) (0.6468) (0.4360) (0.5982) 
Manufacturing 
2000 to 
3999 
0.0912 0.2262 0.1269 0.4443 0.1416 0.0559 0.0869 0.2844 
0.6885 14286 
(0.7042) (0.4432) (0.4963) (0.6677) (0.7257) (0.7050) (0.4887) (0.7055) 
Transport. & 
Public Utilities 
4000 to 
4999 
0.0317 0.0514 0.0762 0.1592 0.3013 0.0443 0.0457 0.3913 
0.6308 3875 
(0.7411) (0.7786) (0.6628) (0.7410) (0.4536) (0.6420) (0.6885) (0.5406) 
Wholesale 
Trade 
5000 to 
5199 
0.0205 0.0875 0.2300 0.3380 0.1951 0.0667 0.1737 0.4355 
0.7054 1173 
(0.8482) (0.6683) (0.2821) (0.8019) (0.6352) (0.6536) (0.3119) (0.6264) 
Retail Trade 
5200 to 
5999 
0.0310 0.1029 0.0646 0.1985 0.2076 0.0503 0.1206 0.3785 
0.7104 2018 
(0.8085) (0.5947) (0.7297) (0.7832) (0.6189) (0.7282) (0.3836) (0.6509) 
Finance, 
Insurance, Real 
Estate 
6000 to 
6799 
0.1536 0.1811 0.1214 0.4560 0.1833 0.0784 0.0425 0.3042 
0.6459 937 
(0.5904) (0.5551) (0.6800) (0.5914) (0.6889) (0.6842) (0.7569) (0.6904) 
Services 
7000 to 
8999 
0.0703 0.1941 0.1658 0.4301 0.1656 0.0574 0.0694 0.2924 
0.6819 5850 
(0.6989) (0.4619) (0.4371) (0.6621) (0.7022) (0.7021) (0.6211) (0.6981) 
Public Admin. 
9100 to 
9999 
0.1124 0.2753 0.0619 0.4497 0.0450 0.1101 0.0678 0.2229 
0.7727 390 
(0.7311) (0.5103) (0.7868) (0.7118) (0.9054) (0.7225) (0.7115) (0.8226) 
Average - 
0.0700 0.1740 0.1226 0.3666 0.1790 0.0564 0.0812 0.3166 
0.6844 - 
(0.7276) (0.5283) (0.5381) (0.6982) (0.6674) (0.6973) (0.5433) (0.6731) 
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TABLE 2.7: PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
The table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between WASC and its various percentile accounts from 2010 
to 2016. Total assets book value is used as the ratio divisor. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are 
reported in table 10. Correlation coefficients with superscripts ***, **, and * have a statistical significance level of 
one percent, five percent, and ten percent, respectively. The last row reports the correlation between each account’s 
ratio and the account’s percentile. 
 
Percentiles 
Interest 
Inv. 
Cash Receivab. 
Monetary 
Asset 
LT Debt ST Debt Payables 
Monetary 
Liability 
WASC 
Interest 
Inv. 
1.0000         
Cash 0.1044*** 1.0000        
Receivab. -0.0642*** -0.0733*** 1.0000       
Monetary 
Asset 
0.9932*** 0.2049*** -0.0149*** 1.0000      
LT Debt -0.1231*** -0.3699*** -0.0175*** -0.1616*** 1.0000     
ST Debt -0.1035*** -0.0746*** -0.0104** -0.1105*** 0.1561*** 1.0000    
Payables -0.2374*** 0.0275*** 0.2915*** -0.2146*** -0.0619*** 0.2551*** 1.0000   
Monetary 
Liability 
-0.1629*** -0.3165*** -0.0012 -0.1941*** 0.8314*** 0.6757*** 0.1523*** 1.0000  
WASC 0.6236*** -0.1014*** -0.0121** 0.6033*** 0.5529*** 0.4652*** -0.0397*** 0.6652*** 1.0000 
Percentiles 
with Ratios 
-0.7778*** -0.8402*** -0.8605** -0.4260*** -0.0798*** -0.0761*** -0.0929*** -0.0501*** - 
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Table 7 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between WASC and its 
various percentile accounts. Due to the weights format, WASC is highly correlated 
with interest-bearing investments and debt percentiles. Moreover, table 7 displays a 
remarkable negative correlation between the cash and long-term debt percentiles. 
Firms that hold greater slacks of cash tend to have lower long-term debt.  
Furthermore, all the monetary liability percentile accounts are negatively correlated 
with the interest-bearing investments percentile. This is probably because firms with 
high monetary liabilities outstanding are not in a condition to invest in considerable 
amounts of monetary assets. Lastly, the payables percentile is noticeably correlated 
with the interest-bearing investments, receivables, and short-term debt percentiles. 
 
For demonstration purposes, we chose to present our results for three publicly 
traded US firms: Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors. Table 8 presents 
the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the period from 
2013 to 2015 using total assets, market capitalization, and average market 
capitalization as ratio divisors. As panel A indicates, Lumber Liquidators has high 
WASC values using all three sorts of ratio divisors. This apparently because Lumber 
Liquidators generally has low levels of monetary assets and liabilities, so that using 
different sorts of ratio divisors would not significantly affect the ratio levels. Firms 
with considerable amounts of monetary assets and liabilities, however, will show 
varying WASC values depending on the ratio divisor used. 
 
On the one hand, firms with a high market-to-book ratio will have relatively 
higher WASC values when market values (e.g., market capitalization or average 
market capitalization) are used as ratio divisors. As indicated in panel B, because 
Tesla’s market-to-book ratio is high across all three years, its WASC values are 
relatively higher when market values, as opposed to book values, are used as ratio 
divisors. On the other hand, firms with a low market-to-book ratio will have relatively 
higher WASC values when total book asset value is used as a ratio divisor. Panel C 
displays that General Motors’ WASC values are relatively higher when book values  
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TABLE 2.8: WASC FOR LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, TESLA, AND GENERAL MOTORS 
 
Panels A, B, and C present the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors, respectively. For each 
firm, the WASC is reported over the period from 2013 to 2015 using total assets, market capitalization, and average 
market capitalization as ratio divisors.  Market-to-book ratio is also reported. Market capitalization is the total 
market value of a firm's outstanding common shares at the firm’s annual reporting date. Average market 
capitalization is the average monthly market capitalization over the twelve months prior to each firm’s annual 
reporting date.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Lumber Liquidators Inc. 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor 0.9502 0.9648 0.9166 
WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.9767 0.9772 0.8934 
WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.9581 0.9656 0.9121 
Market-to-Book Ratio 6.0455 3.6671 1.4489 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Tesla Inc. 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor 0.5751 0.5046 0.5667 
WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.7828 0.7096 0.7367 
WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.7352 0.6852 0.7123 
Market-to-Book Ratio 8.6492 5.4403 4.6279 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: General Motors Co. 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
WASC using total assets as a ratio divisor 0.4249 0.4134 0.3953 
WASC using market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.1649 0.1208 0.1234 
WASC using average market capitalization as a ratio divisor 0.1440 0.1158 0.1012 
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.1830 1.1403 1.0966 
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are used as ratio divisors. This is apparently because General Motors’ market-to-book 
ratio is low across all three years. 
 
Table 8 signifies the importance of choosing the appropriate ratio divisor to 
calculate the WASC. As discussed in section three of this paper, the use of market 
values as ratio divisors may be inappropriate in assessing Shariah compliance 
because they mainly reflect future growth opportunities rather than current 
possessions of assets and liabilities. Also, and most importantly, the use of market 
values is expected to lead to undesirable investment performances when stocks are 
mispriced.  
 
Table 9 presents three different WASC values using three different sets of weights 
for General Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as a ratio divisor. It seems 
that the weight effect (i.e., the use of different sets of weights) does not significantly 
change the WASC. Compared to the first set of weights, the second set of weights 
assigns different weights to the different accounts of monetary assets and liabilities, 
whereas the third set of weights assigns different weights to both monetary assets 
and liabilities and their different accounts. The weight effect may become significant 
if there are large discrepancies between the various percentile values used to 
calculate the WASC. Table 10 reports the WASC along with its various accounts for 
General Motors over the period from 2013 to 2015 using total assets as a ratio divisor. 
The WASC seems to be stable and consistent over time. To test for WASC persistence, 
we use the Durbin-Watson statistic and residual plots. Our unreported results show 
that the time series is positively autocorrelated. This implies that WASC tends to 
remain in an equivalent status and persist from one year to the next. In other words, 
future values of WASC are probabilistically predictable and depend on past and 
current values. 
 
Table 11 reports the WASC along with its various accounts for Lumber 
Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as a  
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TABLE 2.9: WASC AND PERCENTILE ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS IN 2015 
 
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for General Motors for the year of 2015 using 
total assets as the ratio divisor.  All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported in parentheses. 
Three different WASC values are presented using three different sets of weights. The numbers in brackets denote 
the weights of the various accounts of the WASC. 
 
GM 2015 2015 Weight 1 Weight 2 Weight 3 
Interest-bearing 
Investments 
0.2937 
(15%) 
 [70%]  [85%]  [85%] 
Cash 
0.5765 
(8%) 
 [20%]  [10%]  [10%] 
Receivables 
0.3655 
(14%) 
 [10%]  [05%]  [05%] 
Monetary Assets  - 
0.3575 
[45%] 
0.3256 
[45%] 
0.3256 
[35%] 
     
Long Term Debt 
0.5561 
(22%) 
 [55%] [55%]  [55%] 
Short Term Debt 
0.3363 
(10%) 
 [35%]  [40%]  [40%] 
Payables 
0.2397 
(12%) 
 [10%]  [05%]  [05%] 
Monetary 
Liabilities 
 - 
0.4476 
[55%] 
0.4524 
[55%] 
0.4524 
[45%] 
     
Interest R/E - - - 
0.5436 
[20%] 
     
WASC - 0.4070 0.3953 0.4263 
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TABLE 2.10: WASC AND PERCENTILE ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS FROM 2013 TO 2015 
 
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for General Motors over the period from 
2013 to 2015 using total assets as the ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported 
in parentheses. The numbers in brackets denote the weights of the various accounts of the WASC.  
 
GM  Weights 2013 2014 2015 
Interest-bearing 
Investments 
[85%] 
0.2771 
(15%) 
0.2876 
(15%) 
0.2937 
(15%) 
Cash [10%] 
0.4870 
(12%) 
0.5079 
(11%) 
0.5765 
(8%) 
Receivables [05%] 
0.3891 
(14%) 
0.3523 
(14%) 
0.3655 
(14%) 
Monetary Assets [45%] 
0.3037 
(41%) 
0.3129 
(40%) 
0.3256 
(36%) 
     
Long Term Debt [55%] 
0.6635 
(13%) 
0.6093 
(18%) 
0.5561 
(22%) 
Short Term Debt [40%] 
0.3682 
(9%) 
0.3698 
(8%) 
0.3363 
(10%) 
Payables [05%] 
0.2387 
(14%) 
0.2522 
(13%) 
0.2397 
(12%) 
Monetary Liabilities [55%] 
0.5242 
(36%) 
0.4957 
(39%) 
0.4524 
(45%) 
     
WASC - 0.4249 0.4134 0.3953 
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TABLE 2.11:  WASC FOR LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, TESLA, AND GENERAL MOTORS IN 2015 
 
This table reports the WASC along with its various percentile accounts for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General 
Motors for the year of 2015 using total assets as the ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are 
also reported in parentheses. The numbers in brackets denote the weights of the various accounts of the WASC. 
 
2015 Weights Lumber Liquidators Inc. Tesla Inc. General Motors Co. 
Interest-bearing 
Investments 
[85%] 
1.0000 
(0.0%) 
0.8635 
(0.3%) 
0.2937 
(15%) 
Cash [10%] 
0.6426 
(6%) 
0.4015 
(15%) 
0.5765 
(8%) 
Receivables [05%] 
0.7303 
(4%) 
0.8569 
(2%) 
0.3655 
(14%) 
Monetary Assets [45%] 
0.9508 
(10%) 
0.8170 
(17%) 
0.3256 
(36%) 
     
Long Term Debt [55%] 
0.8681 
(4%) 
0.5079 
(25%) 
0.5561 
(22%) 
Short Term Debt [40%] 
1.0000 
(0.0%) 
0.1771 
(33%) 
0.3363 
(10%) 
Payables [05%] 
0.2247 
(13%) 
0.2337 
(13%) 
0.2397 
(12%) 
Monetary Liabilities [55%] 
0.8887 
(17%) 
0.3618 
(71%) 
0.4524 
(45%) 
     
WASC - 0.9166 0.5667 0.3953 
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ratio divisor. All financial ratios used to calculate the WASC are also reported in 
parentheses. Lumber Liquidators seem to have low proportions of monetary assets 
and liabilities, making it more Shariah compliant than 91.66% of publicly traded US 
firms in 2015. It does not carry any interest-bearing investments or short-term debt 
and hence was given a percentile of 100% for both accounts. On the contrary, Tesla 
carries very significant proportions of short-term debt and hence was given a short-
term debt percentile of 17.71%. This percentile means that Tesla's short-term debt 
obligations are more Shariah compliant than only 17.71% of publicly traded US firms 
in 2015. Stated differently, in terms of Shariah compliance, Tesla's holdings of short-
term debt are worse than 82.29% of publicly traded US firms in 2015.  
 
Figure 1 displays the ratios and percentiles of the various WASC accounts for 
General Motors over the period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor. 
It seems clear that there exists a negative relationship between each ratio and its 
percentiles. Though, this negative relation is not perfect and varies from each account 
to another due to the changing aggregate firm behavior over time. For example, while 
General Motors' interest-bearing investments ratio remained constant at 15% from 
2013 to 2015, its interest-bearing investments percentile increased gradually from 
27.71% to 29.37% over the same time period. This is probably because US firms have, 
on average, experienced an increase in the interest-bearing investments ratio over 
the sample period (i.e., aggregate US firms’ interest-bearing investments behavior 
has worsened from the Shariah stand-point). 
 
Figure 2 displays the ratios and percentiles of monetary assets and liabilities 
along with the WASC for Lumber Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the 
period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor. Since firms were ranked 
from bottom to top based on their ratio value, firms with the highest ratio for a given 
account will always have the lowest percentile for that account. Also, firms with the 
second highest ratio will always have the second lowest percentile and so on. For 
example, figure 2 shows that, relative to the other two firms, Lumber Liquidators has  
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FIGURE 2.1: WASC'S ACCOUNTS FOR GENERAL MOTORS FROM 2010 TO 2016 
 
These figures report the ratios and percentiles of the various WASC accounts for General Motors over the period from 
2010 to 2016 using total assets as a ratio divisor. The weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in 
table 10. The correlation between interest-bearing investments percentile and ratio is -0.9455. The correlation between 
cash percentile and ratio is -0.9841. The correlation between receivables percentile and ratio is -0.9678. The correlation 
between long term debt percentile and ratio is -0.9929. The correlation between short term debt percentile and ratio is 
-0.9672. The correlation between payables percentile and ratio is -0.9587. The correlation between monetary assets 
percentile and ratio is -0.6369. The correlation between monetary liabilities percentile and ratio is -0.9891. 
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FIGURE 2.2: MONETARY ASSETS AND LIABILITIES FROM 2010 TO 2016 
 
These figures report the percentiles and ratios of monetary assets and liabilities along with the WASC for Lumber 
Liquidators, Tesla, and General Motors over the period from 2010 to 2016 using total assets as the ratio divisor.  The 
weights of the various accounts of the WASC are reported in table 10. 
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the lowest monetary assets ratio, but the highest monetary assets percentile over the 
sample period. 
 
6. Conclusion:  
This paper develops a financial quantitative measure (i.e., WASC) that reflects 
the rate to which a firm complies with Shariah relative to other firms located in a 
certain region at a certain time. The appealing feature of the WASC is its capability 
of translating financial Shariah-compliance assessments into a simple single precise 
quantitative number, which then can be tested and compared over time and across 
firms. The WASC can be used by academics to proxy for financial Shariah-compliance 
and by fund managers to create a balance between optimizing investment returns 
and Shariah compliance. 
 
In few words, the paper started with providing a brief review of current Shariah-
compliant equity screening practices. Next, it continued with analyzing all the 
optional formats used to customize the WASC by specifying the region, set of weights, 
and set of financial ratios. The general formula for the WASC is then presented. 
Finally, the paper concluded by showing and discussing illustrative results using a 
sample of all publicly traded US firms from the year 2010 to 2016.  
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